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I
INTRODUCTION: POLICY CONTEXT
“No-fault” is the leading alternative to traditional liability systems for re-
solving medically caused injuries.  Some form of no-fault is often mentioned as
an ultimate reform goal, often with relatively little specification of exactly what
it entails.  Policy interest in such reform reflects numerous concerns with the
traditional tort system as it operates in the medical field through malpractice
insurance.  Tort is often said to fall short of achieving its three main goals.1
First, it provides insufficient and inefficient compensation for injuries because
only a tiny fraction of legitimate claims are brought, and claims resolution is
very slow and costly in administrative “overhead.” 2  Second, tort provides only
poorly focused deterrent incentives for patient safety, yet also seems to cause
inappropriate defensive medicine.  Third, there is inadequate accountability or
justice in dispute resolution, as most problems are never discovered, much less
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1. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care Is the Important
Standard, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 335 (Spring 1986).
2. For good summaries of complaints about the traditional medical liability system in the context
of proposed no-fault reform, see, for example, Laurence R. Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alterna-
tive, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277 (Spring 1986).  For more general complaints about medical li-
ability, see, for example, MEDICAL LIABILITY PROJECT, AMERICAN MED. ASS’N, TORT REFORM
CODIFICATION: MODEL MEDICAL LIABILITY AND PRACTICES REFORM ACT (1989); PAUL C.
WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).  For the same with regard to liability processes
generally, see, for example,  PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988); JEFFREY O’CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES,
INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE (1987).
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systematically addressed.
At least conceptually, no-fault addresses these concerns by changing eligi-
bility and payment standards, along with the location and process of decision-
making.  Different forms of no-fault have different goals,3 but a reformed sys-
tem is generally expected to compensate more cases than tort, including many
that could not meet the liability standards of negligence.  Its delivery of com-
pensation should also be more efficient, measured as costs of delivery in dollars
and time, because of expert administration and less formal process.  On the
other hand, potentially offsetting new costs arise under no-fault because eligi-
bility confers ongoing benefits in the fashion of a disability insurance policy and
hence may lead to ongoing disputes not possible after final tort resolutions.
Also, no-fault typically restricts or eliminates payment for non-pecuniary loss.
Such savings should allow a given “compensation budget” to cover more inju-
ries.  Removing some or all cases from tort should reduce physicians’ defensive
over- or under-service to patients.  Comprehensive risk management might im-
prove deterrence, and ties to quality regulation could also promote safety.  Im-
proved accountability is meant to come from objective and consistent investiga-
tion of suspected medical injuries and ties to licensure review, and justice may
be served by promoting consistency of results across similar cases.4
The first actual implementation of no-fault for medical liability occurred in
the late 1980s for newborns with severe birth-related neurological impairments
in Virginia and Florida, largely under the Workers’ Compensation model.5
These no-fault programs were designed to take relatively few injuries out of the
tort system, but are nonetheless consequential.  They deal with major injuries
                                                          
3. No-fault may be as broadly compensatory as the society-wide New Zealand accident compen-
sation system or, alternatively, more narrowly targeted, as under Workers’ Compensation or auto no-
fault.  See generally A. P. BLAIR, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN NEW ZEALAND: THE LAW RE-
LATING TO COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT IN NEW ZEALAND (2d ed. 1983);
MARK S. RHODES & GORDON OHLSEN, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ANSWER BOOK (1997); ALAN I.
WIDISS ET AL., NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN ACTION: THE EXPERIENCES IN MAS-
SACHUSETTS, FLORIDA, DELAWARE AND MICHIGAN (1977).  The latter alternatives are still rather
broad, covering all accidents “arising out of” the workplace or the operation of a motor vehicle.  For
medicine, no-fault proposals have typically been more restricted, as many injuries “arising out of”
medical care are unavoidable side effects of desirable treatment.  See generally Clark C. Havighurst &
Laurence R. Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance—A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice
and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 125 (1973), reprinted in 1974 INS. L.J. 69; Tan-
credi, supra note 2. “Neo-no-fault” has even been proposed as a way to make tort liability more effi-
cient by promoting voluntary settlements.  See Jeffrey O’Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical
Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 129
(Spring 1986).  No-fault systems may emphasize deterrence as well as compensation, through investi-
gation of and intervention in injury-prone areas discovered through claims data and risk management.
No-fault design can encourage such activities through experience rating.  See, e.g., Havighurst & Tan-
credi, supra, at 73; WEILER, supra note 2, at 152-54.
4. For more detail on these arguments in the medical no-fault context, see, for example, Randall
R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance of a Selective No-Fault
System, 265 JAMA 2835 (1991); Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg,  Rethinking Responsi-
bility for Patient Injury: Accelerated-Compensation Events, A Malpractice and Quality Reform Ripe for
a Test, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Spring 1991).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
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in one of the more troublesome areas in the field of medical malpractice.6  They
also represent the only operational medical no-fault systems in the United
States and are hence subject to American legal-administrative culture, unlike
the often cited foreign no-fault models.7  Most importantly, though narrow in
focus, their experience potentially offers valuable lessons for the design of
broader no-fault programs.  Any broader programs will face such issues as de-
fining and enforcing eligibility rules, determining causation, managing ongoing
expenses and generally providing compensation efficiently.  To reach their tar-
get populations, programs need to develop case-intake mechanisms.  To avoid
excess cost, they have to optimize ongoing oversight of care and find ways to
limit compensation per paid claimant.
This article reports on the administrative experience of the Florida and Vir-
ginia programs, with emphasis on Florida.  It briefly describes these compensa-
tion systems as established by statute and implemented administratively.  It
then considers evidence on no-fault performance, especially with regard to effi-
ciency of compensation, as measured by speed of resolution and level of ad-
ministrative cost, compared with similar obstetrical tort cases in Florida.  This
article goes beyond prior legal analyses of legislative history and program de-
sign8 or descriptive case studies of early implementation9 to analyze seven years
                                                          
6. See generally INSTITUTE OF MED., MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY
OF OBSTETRICAL CARE (1989).
7. See GEOFFREY W.R. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979); MARILYN M. ROTHENTHAL, DEALING
WITH MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE BRITISH AND SWEDISH EXPERIENCE 174-86 (1988); Eva D. Co-
hen & Samuel P. Korper, The Swedish No-Fault Patient Compensation Program: Provisions and Pre-
liminary Findings, 1976 INS. L.J. 70; Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)—Medical
Mishap Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 170 (1988).
8. Virginia, as the first state to go no-fault, attracted more legislative history and legal commen-
tary.  See, e.g., James A. Henderson, The Virginia Birth-Related Injury Compensation Act: Limited No-
Fault Statutes as Solutions to the “Medical Malpractice Crisis,” in 2 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LI-
ABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 194 (Victoria P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger eds.,
1989); Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The Virginia
Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451 (1988); Jeffrey O’Connell, Pragmatic Constraints on
Market Approaches: A Response to Professor Epstein, 74 VA. L. REV. 1475 (1988); Jane R. Ward,
Comment, Virginia’s Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act: Constitutional and Policy
Challenges, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 431 (1988); Peter H. White, Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform
for an Endangered Specialty, 74 VA. L. REV. 1487 (1988).
For Florida, public policy was heavily influenced by the Academic Task Force for Review of the In-
surance and Tort Systems.  See Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems,
Preliminary Fact-Finding Report on Medical Malpractice 237-39 (Aug. 14, 1987) (unpublished report
to governor and legislature, on file with Randall Bovbjerg) (noting high premiums of obstetricians);
Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, Medical Malpractice Recom-
mendations 30-34 (Nov. 6, 1987) (unpublished report, on file with Randall Bovbjerg) (recommending a
no-fault system based on the one in Virginia); see also text accompanying note 21 infra.  Thomas R.
Tedcastle & Marvin A. Dewar, Medical Malpractice: A New Treatment for an Old Illness, 16 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 535 (1988), provides very good legislative history.  See also Cynthia L. Gallup, Can No-
Fault Compensation of Impaired Infants Alleviate the Malpractice Crisis in Obstetrics?, 14 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 691 (1989) (analyzing symptoms and causes of liability insurer problems in obstetrics
and likely influence of reform on insurer behavior); David E.M. Sappington, Designing Optional No-
Fault Insurance Policies for Health Care Systems, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 113 (1994)
(examining incentive effects of the two programs).
9. Much descriptive information about the programs’ design and their very early experience has
already appeared.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON
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of policy-relevant administrative data.  The focus is on claims-handling admini-
stration as compared with tort litigation, not on general administration such as
personnel practices or collection of premiums.  The first three years’ experience
was considered separately, as more “mature” performance was presumed to be
more typical and generalizable.  It is of course important for these states to
consider how well the specific administrative operations of these particular
programs meet their statutory goals.  The most important lessons for policy
makers elsewhere, however, are how well limited no-fault compensation sys-
tems meet the general no-fault goal of improved efficiency and how observed
administrative practice might be generalizable to other, larger programs.
II
NO-FAULT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
A. Legislative History
Virginia enacted its Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act
in 1987,10 governing births on and after January 1, 1988.11  Although the reform
had roots in “neo-no-fault,”12 it was enacted primarily as a tort reform, to deal
with the same sort of liability insurance crisis that inspired most 1970s and
1980s legislation in the field.13  The Virginia crisis was a very specific one—the
threatened withdrawal of liability coverage for Virginia physicians delivering
babies.14  The statute sought to remove expensive and unpredictable “bad
                                                          
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS (1993); Kenneth V. Heland & Penny Rutledge, No-Fault Compensa-
tion for Neurologically Impaired Infants: The Virginia Experience, 2 CURRENT OBST. & GYNECOL. 58
(1992); Jill Horwitz & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury: A Case Study,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 164; Walter Wadlington & Warren J. Wood III, Two “No-Fault” Com-
pensation Schemes for Birth Defective Infants in the United States, 7 PROF. NEGL. 40 (1991).  A very
detailed description of Florida appears in Jill R. Horwitz, No-Fault Medical Malpractice Reform: A
Case Study of the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (1994)
(unpublished thesis, Harvard University School of Government) (on file with Randall Bovbjerg).  A
similarly detailed state-specific assessment of Virginia was undertaken in response to House Joint
Resolution 641, passed by the House and Senate on February 19 and 20, 1997.  The report, won by a
team of researchers at the College of William and Mary, was scheduled to be published in 1998.
10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5001 to -5021 (Michie 1994).
11. Id. § 38.2-5014.
12. See, e.g., Ronald K. Davis & Sandra L. Kramer, The Policy Implications of the Injured Infant
Act, VA. HOSP. ASS’N PERSP.  May 22, 1987, at 1; Ken Heland, The Virginia Birth-Related Neurologi-
cal Injury Compensation Act (H. 1216), LEGIS-LETTER (American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists), May 1987, at 2; O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1476-77.  These nearly contemporaneous ac-
counts were confirmed by this study’s recent interviews.  See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and
a Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499 (1989), reprinted in 3 NAT’L INS. L. REV. 217
(1989); Glen O. Robinson, The Malpractice Crisis of the 1970’s: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (Spring 1986).
14. Two leading carriers suspended sales of new policies, and another planned to drop all obstetri-
cians except those in medical groups of 10 or more.  See White, supra note 8, at 1488 n.5.  The air of
crisis in access to medical care was quite real for many state legislators debating the no-fault bill in the
waning days of the 1987 session, as seen in videotape of the Assembly debate.  See Videotape: The
1987 General Assembly—The Injured Infants’ Act (Medical Society of Virginia, created from Assem-
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baby” cases from the courts to an administrative forum, to be resolved at a
lower cost under no-fault standards.15  The laws resemble “caps” on tort awards
in that they aim to hold down tort spending and keep liability coverage avail-
able by addressing the largest cases.16  The immediate goals were to keep liabil-
ity insurance available and to prevent the “negative defensive medicine” of cur-
tailed access to obstetrical services, especially in inner-city and rural areas.17
Secondarily, the law was intended to cover costs for a very needy eligible
population.  It is, after all, labeled a “compensation” act.18
Florida followed Virginia’s lead the next year.19  Its Birth-Related Neuro-
logical Injury Compensation Act was created by a 1988 statute and imple-
mented for births on or after January 1, 1989.20  Its provisions explicitly copied
Virginia’s law, often almost verbatim, in keeping with the recommendation of a
                                                          
bly footage, Nov. 25, 1987) (on file with Randall Bovbjerg); see also Beverly Orndorff, Malpractice In-
surance Problem Is Called Real Crisis, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 1987, at B3; Ward, supra note
11.  In the mid-1980s, obstetrical malpractice claims generally received a lot of policy attention.  For
example, a panel of the prestigious Institute of Medicine produced a two-volume book on the topic.
See INSTITUTE OF MED., supra note 6.  Many thought birth-related claims unjustified but difficult to
defend.  See Marvin Cornblath & Russell L. Clark, Neonatal “Brain Damage”: An Analysis of 250
Claims, 140 W.J. MED. 298 (1984).  Virginia and Florida, however, were the only states ever to adopt
obstetrics-specific reforms.
15. The leading liability insurer, The Virginia Insurance Reciprocal, specifically signaled that it
would reopen enrollment of policyholders if severe birth-related injuries were removed from the li-
ability system.  See, e.g., Davis & Kramer, supra note 12.
16. Contemporaneous accounts suggest that legislative desire to enact birth-related no-fault grew
in part from a lower court’s invalidating Virginia’s previously enacted cap on non-pecuniary loss.  See
Ward, supra note 8, at 431-33.  Certainly, high awards, even exceeding the then-current cap, were a
major concern for doctors in the mid-1980s.  See Ronald K. Davis, Searching for a New System, 112
VA. MED. 235 (1985) (“crisis” argument citing three multimillion dollar awards—two involving child-
birth—by the chair of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Malpractice in the monthly publication of the
medical society); see also Videotape: Working Together We Made History: The Medical Society of
Virginia’s 1987 Professional Liability Reform Legislative Campaign (Medical Society of Virginia,
1987) (on file with Randall Bovbjerg) (overturning the cap was a “real bombshell” that caused “near
panic” just 60 days before the start of the 1987 legislative session, according to Richard L. Fields,
M.D., President of the Society).  The cap was later upheld.  See Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir.
1989).
17. In an interview, Professor O’Connell particularly stressed the political importance of this un-
usual urban-rural alliance.  Interview with Jeffrey O’Connell, Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law at
University of Virginia Law School, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 12, 1998) [hereinafter O’Connell inter-
view].  The Virginia statute requires that participating hospitals have a plan for improving access to
obstetrical services.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Michie 1994).  The focus of this article and the
study from which it comes was claims administration, not other aspects of the programs, but it appears
that this statutory provision has not received any administrative attention.
18. The Florida enactment, but not the Virginia one, specifies legislative findings and intent.  The
findings relate to reducing the cost of obstetrical liability insurance.  The intent is to compensate a
limited class of catastrophic obstetrical injuries.  Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 766.301(1)(a)-(d) (1996) with
id. ch. 766.301(2).
19. Ironically, in seeking to build support for the childbirth reform beyond the obstetrical commu-
nity, leaders of the Virginia Medical Society had argued that reform was needed to help prevent the
state from going the way of Florida, perceived as a far more litigious and problematic area for medical
practice generally.  See Memorandum from Ronald K. Davis, Chair of Professional Liability Commit-
tee of the Medical Society of Virginia, to all Virginia Physicians (Fall 1987) (on file with Randall
Bovbjerg).
20. FLA. STAT. chs. 766.301-.316 (1996).
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blue-ribbon commission.21  The Florida legislation also arose primarily from a
perceived liability insurance crisis, but a more general one.22  Other tort reforms
received far more attention from the commission,23 but in a special legislative
session, no-fault was among the minority actually adopted.24  There are some
differences in the statutes, as highlighted below, notably in the breadth of eligi-
bility for no-fault benefits.  Additional differences have arisen in the course of
administrative implementation.
The programs were not born or raised as identical twins, but they nonethe-
less bear a strong “sororital” resemblance, and their administrators frequently
consult each other about issues of common concern.25  This paper accordingly
describes and discusses them together.  More reliance is placed on Florida data
because of that program’s larger size and the availability in Florida of informa-
tion on comparable obstetrical malpractice cases.26
B. Administrative Structure
1. Operations and Governance.  The programs are easily analogized to
Workers’ Compensation.27  Both statutes gave decisionmaking authority to
their Workers’ Compensation Commissions.28  Moreover, the constitutionality
                                                          
21. See Academic Task Force, Medical Malpractice Recommendations, supra note 8, at 30-34.
22. See, e.g., Dave Bruns, Malpractice Battle Looms Again, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 1,
1988, at 1A.  Florida’s generally litigious climate had by that time already led to the complete with-
drawal of the nation’s largest single insurer of physicians.  According to a contemporaneous interview,
the St. Paul Group, of St. Paul, Minnesota, ceased underwriting any coverage in the state in the mid-
1980s.  Numerous other alternatives for coverage remained, including a physician-run mutual and a
large number of “trust” vehicles.  Obstetrical coverage has been available throughout.  The overall
atmosphere of crisis in Florida is shown by the legislative preamble to 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-1 (e.g.,
“WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that there is in Florida a financial crisis in the medical liability in-
surance industry …”).  No-fault was established by sections 60-77 of this chapter’s 87 sections.
23. The Florida legislative provisions (“NICA”) follow numerous tort reform and medical regula-
tory provisions in its enabling legislation.  NICA begins with section 60 of 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-1.  The
Academic Task Force covered many other reforms before turning to NICA, also developing much less
supporting documentation for it than for others.  See Academic Task Force for Review of the Insur-
ance and Tort Systems, supra note 8.
24. See Tedcastle & Dewar, supra note 8.
25. Each program has had a single Executive Director for virtually its entire life—Elinor J. Pyles,
R.N., in Virginia; Lynn B. Dickinson in Florida.  These two capable administrators provided extensive
access to data and many interviews and follow-up sessions, both in person and by telephone, starting in
December 1994 during preparation of the funding proposal for this project and continuing to the pres-
ent.  Most operational information about the programs presented in this section, unless otherwise
cited, comes from these discussions.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.  Some other states in the early 1990s seriously con-
sidered similar legislation, including North Carolina for cerebral palsy and New York for birth-related
neurological impairment.  See Kenneth Heland, Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Funds: Solution or Stopgap? 77 AM. C. SURGEONS BULL. 27 (1992); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Bad “Bad
Baby” Bills, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 126 nn.4-5 (1994); see also Julian D. Bobbitt, Jr., et al., North Caro-
lina’s Proposed Birth-Related Neurological Impairment Act: A Provocative Alternative, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 837 (1991) (discussing unsuccessful North Carolina proposal).  No state has followed
Virginia and Florida.
27. See generally ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (1992); MARK S. RHODES
& GORDON OHLSSEN, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ANSWER BOOK (1997).
28. In Virginia, this is the Workers’ Compensation Commission (previously the Industrial Com-
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of the acts was grounded in the venerable workplace precedent of trading away
access to tort for a new, no-fault payment program.29  Claimants file petitions
with the Commissions, which are empowered to hold hearings and approve or
deny payment, exercising their customary powers and authority.30  In Florida,
dissatisfaction with Commission procedures led to a statutory amendment
urged by the no-fault administration to move jurisdiction over no-fault cases to
the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”).31
However, the no-fault programs are mainly administered outside the Com-
missions.  As for most of Worker’s Compensation, outside entities receive
premiums, investigate claims, and bear the risk that claims will outrun the
funding collected to cover them.  The Virginia and Florida programs, however,
operate not through private insurance but through public entities outside the
conventional state departmental structure.  In Virginia the entity is the Birth-
Related Injury Compensation Program (popularly known as BIF, for Birth In-
jury Fund).32  In Florida it is the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Association (“NICA”).33
Virginia’s BIF is governed by a board of seven unsalaried directors ap-
pointed by the Governor, four representing medical providers and liability in-
surers, and three representing the public at large.34  NICA’s corresponding
board is appointed by the Insurance Commissioner, and has only one citizen
                                                          
mission of Virginia).  In Florida, it is the Division of Workers’ Compensation of the Department of
Labor and Employment Security.  Professor Jeffrey O’Connell has argued the desirability of using
Workers’ Compensation models and agencies for reform, as their constitutionality is well established.
Professor O’Connell is one of the fathers of “no-fault” auto insurance in the United States (with Rob-
ert Keeton) and a proponent of not dissimilar approaches to medical injury.  He was closely associated
with the Virginia Medical Society’s proposals that ultimately led to the enacted statute.  See O’Connell
interview, supra note 17.
29. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917);  Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U.S. 219 (1917).  See generally LARSON, supra note 27.  The Virginia and Florida no-fault pro-
grams are much smaller in scope than Workers’ Compensation, and they exclude from tort only a
comparably small number of cases.  Neither state’s statute has had a reported judicial decision on its
basic constitutionality.  The assessment mechanism of both states has been upheld against constitu-
tional challenges by non-participating doctors.  See King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Program, 410 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1991); McGibony v. Florida Birth Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Plan, 576 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1990); Coy v. Florida Birth Related Neurological In-
jury Compensation Plan., 595 So. 2d. 943 (Fla. 1992).  In both states, all licensed physicians are swept
in, with some exceptions for public employees as well as teaching faculty and graduate medical stu-
dents.
30. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.315 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008 (Michie 1994).
31. By operation of 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-251, the transfer occurred effective May 15, 1993.  Ac-
cording to NICA and DOAH sources, there was an initial issue as to whether pending cases would re-
main at Workers’ Compensation.  Litigation was required to compel at least one judge of compensa-
tion claims to relinquish authority to DOAH to make the final order in the case.  See Florida Birth
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n v. DeMarko, 640 So. 2d. 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).  DOAH records show that many were transferred by June.  See, e.g., Acebo v. Florida Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n, Case No. 93-3000N (State of Florida, Division of
Administrative Hearings) (June 2, 1993).
32. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5002 (Michie 1994).
33. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.303 (1996).
34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5016(C) (Michie 1994).
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representative, five members in all.35  The same physician (a non-obstetrician
physician) has chaired the Virginia board for most of its existence.  There has
been more turnover in Florida.  As a matter of program operations, the Florida
board acts more like a corporate board, considering matters of general policy.
In contrast, the Virginia board actively reviews nearly every claim made (of
which there are far fewer than in Florida).
Day-to-day operations are handled by BIF and NICA staff, each headed by
an Executive Director.  BIF has one additional employee, and NICA has sev-
eral others.  Office space is rented on the private market, and many functions
are contracted out, either to private entities or to other public entities.  In Vir-
ginia, for a time, even claims handling was contracted out to a liability insurer,
although the function was brought back “in house” because of dissatisfaction
with the level of service and information systems capability maintained under
the fixed-price contract.  BIF now runs all of its own claims investigation.
Medical opinions are obtained from consultant physicians in both states.
The exact legal status of BIF and NICA is ambiguous.  They exercise legis-
latively conferred authority under their enabling acts, operate under the direc-
tion of Boards appointed by state officials, and use state letterhead.  However,
they do not operate under administrative procedure acts, sunshine laws, or civil
service provisions.36  Their style of operations resembles that of an advisory
commission.  Technically, BIF and NICA are advisory in that final authority in
a sense lies with Workers’ Compensation, which holds de novo hearings and is a
regular “line” agency of government subject to normal administrative rules.37
However, in practice BIF and NICA decisions are very influential, not merely
advisory.
2. Funding.  In both states, funding comes primarily from premiums paid
by voluntarily participating physicians and hospitals.38  Though popularly
termed “premiums,” the statutory term “assessment” is more accurate, as the
statutory fees resemble a head tax.  The flat physician assessment amounts are
unrelated either to risk (for example, number of childbirths attended, location
or nature of medical practice) or experience (for example, past claims
frequency).  In both states, the statutory assessment was $5,000 annually for
participating physicians (those wanting their patients to be covered by no-fault
in lieu of tort).  Hospitals are assessed $50 per live birth, limited in Virginia to
                                                          
35. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.315(c) (1996).
36. As stated by the Judge of Compensation Claims in the first administrative case involving
NICA: “While [NICA] is not a state agency within the purview of the Administrative Procedures Act
nor a corporation under the laws of the State of Florida, it is a chartered ministerial body operating
under the authority and powers of the Constitution and the laws of the State of Florida.” Ross v. Flor-
ida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n, No. 000-01-8951 (State of Florida, Office of Com-
pensation Claims, District “M”) (final order awarding benefits).
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008 (Michie 1994).  In Florida, an amendment replaced the
Workers’s Compensation Department with the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Depart-
ment of Management Services.  See 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-251 § 2.
38. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5020(A) (Michie 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 766.314(4)(c) (1996).
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an annual ceiling of $150,000 for large and small institutions alike.39  The
statutory assessment for non-participating physicians is $250 a year.40  Backstop
funding, if needed to maintain actuarial soundness, can also be raised by pro
rata assessments on all liability or casualty insurers in the state, up to 0.25% of
their premiums.  Reinsurance is permitted, but not required.  Virginia has not
obtained reinsurance.  NICA has a policy, but has never faced high enough no-
fault claims to trigger the reinsurance coverage.  In Virginia, funds collected
must be held by an independent fund manager; in Florida, by the Department
of Insurance.
The boards were also given the power to reduce the assessments if actuari-
ally justified.41  In light of its low level of paid claims, Virginia has eliminated
the non-participants’ fees and reduced the assessments for participants ac-
cording to the length of time they have already paid into the program.  There is
no access to the state general fund or other state revenues in either state, ex-
cept that in Florida NICA received a start-up transfer of $20 million from sur-
plus in an Insurance Department account.42
Insurance regulators are charged with periodically assessing the programs’
actuarial soundness.43  To date, the resulting reviews have found the programs’
funding to be adequate and not excessive.
3. Eligibility.  For an infant’s injury to be covered, both Virginia and
                                                          
39. In Virginia, participating providers are entitled to a credit on their liability insurance premi-
ums by statutory amendment.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5020.1 (Michie 1994).  In Florida, the two
largest insurers give NICA participating physicians a “dollar-for-dollar credit,” according to an unpub-
lished interim report for the House Committee on Insurance.  See Leonard Schulte, Staff Attorney,
Financial Status of [NICA] 5-6 (Dec. 23, 1992) (on file with Randall Bovbjerg).  One leading under-
writer in Virginia planned to give a discount to BIF participating doctors from the very first days of
BIF in January 1988.  See Letter from Judy Kelley, Second Vice President, Virginia Insurance Recip-
rocal, to Ronald K. Davis, of the Virginia Medical Association (Jan. 20, 1988) ($3500 for obstetricians
buying $1 million per claim/$1 million annual aggregate coverage, $800 for family practitioners).
40. Legislative success in Virginia depended on having all funding come from medical sources.
1987 was a non-budget year in the legislature, so no tax revenues could be used.  Moreover, having
medical interests agree to provide funding was “immensely helpful” in increasing their credibility in
the legislature, according to Medical Society top lobbyist Lawrence H. Framme III.  See Videotape:
Working Together, supra note 16 (explaining that normally doctors are seen as looking for a
“handout,” whereas the Act was a “hand-back”).  In both states, some non-participating physicians
challenged the constitutional legitimacy of assessing them to pay for a program that directly benefits
only participants.  The Virginia Supreme Court and the Florida District Court of Appeals both upheld
program funding.  See supra note 29.
41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5020(G) (Michie 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 766.314 (1996).
42. A $20 million transfer from the Insurance Commissioner’s Regulatory Trust Fund was
authorized by FLA. STAT. ch. 766.314(5)(b) (1996) and received during the year ending June 30, 1989.
This was larger than the first year’s collection of $4.8 million from hospital assessments and $10.0 mil-
lion from physicians, according to Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Associa-
tion, Financial Statements, June 30, 1989 (on file with Randall Bovbjerg).  An additional $20 million
transfer from the Insurance Department fund was subsequently authorized but never used.  See Flor-
ida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, Tallahassee, Florida, Financial Statements,
June 30, 1995 (on file with Randall Bovbjerg).  As of the end of NICA’s fiscal 1995, total assets were
$151 million, balanced by $149 million in claims reserves and $2.3 million in retained earnings.  See id.
43. In Virginia, the assessment is performed by the State Corporation Commission.  See VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-5020(E) (Michie 1994).  In Florida it is done by the Department of Insurance.  See
FLA. STAT. ch. 766.314 (1996).
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Florida statutes impose rather restrictive conditions.  Virginia requires that the
following conditions be met: (1) the infant was born alive; (2) an injury
occurred to the spinal cord or brain; (3) the cause of injury was deprivation or
mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscitation; (4) the infant is
permanently disabled as a result44 and is “in need of assistance in all activities of
daily living” (“ADLs”); (5) the injury was not caused by “congenital or genetic
abnormality, degenerative neurological disease, or maternal substance abuse”;
and (6) the injury was either caused by a physician participating in the program
or occurred in a participating hospital.45
The Florida statute limits recovery to live infants weighing over 2,500
grams,46 effectively excluding not only still births but also premature deliveries
that could be covered by Virginia’s plan.47  However, it is otherwise less restric-
tive than the Virginia statute, requiring only that the infant be “permanently
and substantially mentally and physically impaired.”48  The law does not require
that the infant require assistance in all ADLs.  Most observers consider that, on
balance, Virginia’s eligibility criteria are substantially more restrictive than
Florida’s.49
In Florida, as in Virginia, causation by “genetic or congenital abnormality”
is explicitly excluded.50  The enabling statutes make their no-fault remedy the
“exclusive remedy” for eligible injuries.51  Liability claims are barred for any
such injuries unless they were caused “intentionally or willfully”52 or there is
evidence of “bad faith or malicious purpose or willful and wanton disregard of
human rights.”53  However, claimants are free to bring tort claims if rejected for
no-fault, and the tort statute of limitations is tolled during the pendancy of a
no-fault claim.54  Additionally, in practice, there is no bar to a claimant’s going
to tort first.
The statutes thus single out for compensation a particular class of unfortu-
nate medical outcomes that is relatively well-defined by the laws.  This ap-
proach to determining payment responsibility is quite different from the con-
                                                          
44. The original statute required the infant to be “permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, [and] in-
continent.”  1987 Va. Acts ch. 540.  This was changed in 1990 to the slightly less restrictive
“permanently motorically disabled and (i) developmentally disabled or (ii) for infants sufficiently de-
veloped to be cognitively evaluated, cognitively disabled.”  1990 Va. Acts ch. 534.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Michie 1994).
46. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.302(2) (1996).
47. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Michie 1994).
48. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.302(2) (1996).
49. One measure of how much more restrictive Virginia is than Florida comes from a large Vir-
ginia malpractice insurer.  According to its proprietary data, in April 1997, the company had 19 similar
obstetrical malpractice cases pending, of which 13 involved BIF-participating providers where the inju-
ries were not severe enough to qualify under current BIF criteria.  Moving to the Florida standards
would cover the “vast majority” of them.  See Letter from W. Scott Johnson, counsel for The Recipro-
cal Group, to Randall Bovbjerg 2 (Apr. 14, 1997) (on file with Randall Bovbjerg).
50. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.302(2) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Michie 1994).
51. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.303(2) (1996); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5002.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5002(C) (Michie 1994).
53. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.303(2) (1996).
54. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.306 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5005 (Michie 1994).
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ventional medical tort approach, under which every element of the “coverage”
definition—duty of care, breach of duty through substandard care, causation,
and damages—must be determined case by case through expert testimony.55
The Virginia-Florida approach to defining a “compensable event” in advance
resembles that of no-fault programs for adverse immunization reactions56 or the
series of proposals for general “avoidable event” no-fault reform.57  This ap-
proach has the potential to make it easier for claimants to realize that they have
a potentially valid claim, thus simplifying the filing of claims.  It should also
simplify the resolution of claims once brought.  Both effects could make no-
fault faster and less expensive to administer than the tort system.58
4. Benefits.  Compensation in Virginia is limited to monetary loss
(“medically necessary and reasonable expenses” of medical, residential, and
custodial care).59  Florida imposes similar limits.60  All collateral sources are
offset (public and private), and payments are made as expenses are incurred.61
Virginia also makes allowance for lost earnings from ages 18-65, scheduled at
fifty percent of average wages, but Florida does not.62  Neither state covers
“pain and suffering” or other explicitly non-monetary loss, but Florida does
provide a one-time parental allowance of up to $100,000, unchanged since the
start of the program.63  This parental payment may be thought of as coverage
for non-pecuniary loss.64  Reasonable attorneys’ fees approved by the
                                                          
55. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 188 (5th
ed. 1984).
56. The National Vaccine Program uses a “vaccine injury table” to determine eligibility for ad-
ministrative coverage.  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1994).  It replaces the right to litigate, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
11 (1994), and mandates that doctors report injuries, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25 (1994).  See Wendy K.
Mariner, Innovation and Challenge: The First Year of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Pro-
gram, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 1991 at 409.  For a current description and data, see Health Resources and Services Admini-
stration, Bureau of Health Professions, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“VICP”)
<http://www.hrsa.dhhs.gov/bhpr/vicp/new.htm>.  An “Adverse Event Reporting System” is maintained
by the Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Biol-
ogics Evaluation and Research, Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (“VAERS”).  For current
information, see <http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaers.html>.  VAERS resembles the agency’s more general
Adverse Drug Experience Reporting System.  See, e.g., <http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/chapter53.htm>.
57. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 3; COMMISSION ON MED. PROF. LIABILITY,
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (1979);
Tancredi, supra note 2; Laurence R. Tancredi & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Creating Outcomes-Based Sys-
tems for Quality and Malpractice Reform: Methodology of Accelerated-Compensation Events (ACEs),
70 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 183 (1992).  A contemporary account terms the Florida reform a
“‘designated compensable event’ no-fault plan.”  See Tedcastle & Dewar, supra note 8, at 556 n.140.
58. See Tancredi & Bovbjerg, supra note 4.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(1) (Michie 1994).
60. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.31 (1996).
61. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(1) (Michie 1994).
62. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(3) (Michie 1994) with FLA. STAT. ch. 766.31 (1996).
63. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.31(4)(b) (1996).
64. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.31(1)(b) (1996) simply calls the allowable $100,000 “an award to the par-
ents or legal guardians of the infant” without specifying its purpose or how to calculate it; it is distin-
guished from the “[a]ctual expenses for medically necessary” and other services in subsection (a).
Chapter 766.314(9)(a), however, in addressing NICA reserving practice says that reserves should in-
clude the maximum possible for “non-economic damages.”
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Commission are also covered in both states.65
C. Claims Processes
1. Initiation of Claims.  BIF and NICA both rely upon claimants (or their
attorneys) to discover and file no-fault claims.  There is no mandatory
reporting by covered medical providers, and little outreach by the programs.66
In Virginia, the no-fault statute of limitation is ten years.67  In Florida it is five,
reduced from the original seven in 1993.68  Statutes call on both entities to
provide notice of the programs to possible beneficiaries.69  Virginia calls only
for a “clear and concise explanation” to be given “obstetrical patients” about
their “rights and limitations under the program.”70  Florida requires that this
explanation be provided on forms furnished by NICA.71  Providing notice
satisfactorily has been a significant political and judicial issue in both states.
Technically, claims first come to the Commissions, which provide official
copies to BIF and NICA.  In practice, many claimants or their attorneys contact
the programs first.72  Both entities will help claimants prepare cases for filing.
Many families perceive a need for help, as obtaining and duplicating the re-
quired medical records can seem quite onerous.  Many appear to rely on their
lawyers for this service.73
Both BIF and NICA have engaged in some public speaking and other forms
of outreach, but the main avenue of dissemination appears to be a brochure
that briefly describes program eligibility, benefits, and claiming process.  The
brochures are written for patients and certainly seem clear and concise.74  BIF
and NICA print the brochures in large quantities and distribute copies to obste-
tricians and other providers to give to patients.
                                                          
65. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.31(1)(c) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(4) (Michie 1994).
66. A duty to report potential claims at the time of incident is a common contractual provision in
liability insurance, and the federal no-fault vaccine legislation requires reporting.  See supra note 56.
In Florida, medical providers seeking to report likely NICA eligibility by actively making a claim on
behalf of an injured patient were rebuffed.  See White v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Comp. Ass’n., 655 So. 2d. 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).  No-fault was held to allow only claims made
by the families or legal representatives of injured infants.  See id. at 1296.  As to no-fault outreach, see
infra text accompanying note 155.
67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5013 (Michie 1994).
68. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.313 (1996) (original version at 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-251).
69. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.316 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5016(F) (Michie 1994).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5016(F) (Michie 1994).
71. See FLA. STAT. ch 766.316 (1996).
72. The programs do not routinely track the number of informal inquiries they receive about pos-
sible claims that do not mature into claims.  The director’s recollection is that there are not very many
of them.
73. See generally Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How
No-Fault and Tort Differ, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35 (Spring, 1997).  Given only partial no-fault
replacement of tort, families must choose between NICA and tort, and many probably know little
about either, so it is not surprising that they routinely seek legal advice.
74. The programs provide single-sheet brochures; each had been once revised as of mid-1996.  See
A Lifetime of Help (Virginia); Peace of Mind for An Unexpected Problem (Florida) (on file with Ran-
dall Bovbjerg).
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Both statutes provide that the administrative process is to be exclusive,75 but
this too has proved problematic in practice.  Notably, in Florida, courts have
held that a trial judge can make an independent judgment about NICA eligi-
bility, so that a tort claimant need not exhaust her NICA remedies before pro-
ceeding to tort; tort claimants can also allege insufficient notice of exclusivity.76
2. Administrative Process.  BIF and NICA have a limited time period after
receiving notice of a claim to inform the Commission or DOAH whether the
injury falls within the statutory definition and what benefits are appropriate to
the case.77  Medical evidence comes mainly from the written contemporaneous
medical records of each case.  Both BIF and NICA hire consultant physicians
to review these records.  In Florida, the main consultant often makes a physical
examination of the infant.  Delays sometimes occur if agreement is not quickly
reached as to when and how to do this.
Next, the Commissions have a short statutory time period within which to
hold a hearing.78  In practice, hearings occur mainly in disputed cases. BIF or
NICA and the claimants are parties in any hearing.  Physician “defendants”
seldom attend or send an attorney.79  Medical evidence comes in mainly as
depositions, sometimes as live testimony.  Discovery by parties is allowed
through interrogatories or depositions, just as in actions at law.80  Both statutes
have special provisions for independent, three-physician panels to review cases,
but this seldom occurs.81  Proceedings range in formality from a telephone con-
ference call to a full-dress administrative proceeding.  The Virginia statute calls
for proceedings to be held in the city or county of birth or a neighboring one.82
In Virginia, Commission cases are heard by one commissioner, but the full
                                                          
75. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.303(2) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5002(B) (Michie 1994).
76. See Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n v. McKaughan, 668 So.2d 974 (Fla.
1996).  Kenneth V. Heland of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has argued—
for example, at the conference at which this article was presented—that bypassing NICA will require
tort claimants to undercut their own liability cases.  Address at the IMPACS/Duke Medical Malprac-
tice Conference (Sept. 12-13, 1997).  He suggests, quite plausibly, claimants will have to convince a
judge that their cases do not involve very serious birth-related neurological injury, which will, in prac-
tice, limit the number of viable tort claims for high damages or bar much evidence about medical con-
duct during delivery.  However, arguing lack of notice, per Galen v. Braniff, 696 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1997),
does not constrain plaintiffs’ factual arguments.  See also notes 156-61 infra and accompanying text.
77. The time limit on a written response to the Commission is 30 days in Virginia.  See VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-5004(C) (1996).  In Florida the limit is 45 days.  See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.305(3) (1996).
78. In Virginia, the Commission has 45-120 days after filing.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5006(A)
(Michie 1994).  In Florida, the limit is 60-120 days.  See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.307(1) (1996).
79. The language of tort liability continues under no-fault operations.  For example, administra-
tors track “defense” costs.  See NICA, Total Payments by Birth Year/Claims Year (administrative re-
port on file with Randall Bovbjerg).
80. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.307(3) (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5007 (Michie 1994).
81. In Virginia, the deans of the state medical schools are to arrange for panels, whose composi-
tion is statutorily defined.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008(B) (Michie 1994).  In Florida, the Insur-
ance Commissioner appoints the panel.  See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.308(1) (1996).  The process exists in
Virginia (deans of the two schools alternate years and name panel members), but, in practice, panel
input is seldom called for.  In Florida, the process has evidently not been funded, according to NICA
and DOAH officials.
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5006(A) (Michie 1994).
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Commission must rehear the case if requested within twenty days.83  Upon a fi-
nal order, the programs pay the claimant(s), attorneys, medical providers, and
any others entitled to remuneration.84  Administrative determinations are final
as to matters of fact, and questions of law may be appealed to the state Court of
Appeals within thirty days in Virginia.85  In Florida, appeals go to the District
Court of Appeal.86
III
STUDY DATA AND METHODS
This evaluation of administrative performance was possible only because
the no-fault programs maintain administrative data systems with information
on each claim.  Moreover, in Florida, DOAH maintains remarkably complete
public files on each case, with automated docket records and hearing officer
decisions.  No comparable data system exists for litigation.  It is fortunate for
evaluation that Florida requires all insurers and self-insurers to report substan-
tial information on closed malpractice claims.  Basic data are automated, and
narrative descriptions of claims and circumstances can be photocopied. 87
Most study data come from Florida, the larger program, on which more de-
tailed information is available, and for which comparable tort data exist.  We
obtained automated administrative data from NICA on all claims made as of
June 1996.88  For each claim, data included the following: date of birth and of
claim; all payments made, by type (for example, for investigation, lawyers’ fees,
and costs), and for benefits by type of payment; claims status; and reserve es-
tablished, if any.  Additional data on each NICA claim were obtained from
DOAH automated docket books and matched to the NICA administrative
data.89  Some Virginia no-fault claims data were also obtained from program
administrators.
To provide context and interpretation of administrative performance in
both states, we conducted legal and literature reviews, as well as executive in-
terviews with program administrators and other informed observers.90  In the
                                                          
83. See id. § 38.2-5010.
84. See id. § 38.2-5009; FLA. STAT. ch. 766.31 (1996)
85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5011(B) (Michie 1994).
86. See FLA. STAT. ch. 766.311(1) (1996).
87. The Florida data are a unique resource of all malpractice claims closed in Florida since 1976.
The data are maintained by the state Insurance Department and can be obtained for a fee.  The data
have been used for this and other studies.  See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Kenneth R. Petronis, The
Relationship Between Physicians’ Malpractice Claims History and Later Claims: Does the Past Predict
the Future?, 272 JAMA 1421 (1994); Sloan et al., supra note 73; Frank A. Sloan et al., Medical Mal-
practice of Physicians: Predictable or Haphazard?, 262 JAMA 3291 (1989).
88. Our claims universe was set as of our site visit to Florida on June 10, 1996, which included mi-
cro-data on files opened and payments made through May 15, as well as status as of that date from
summary sheets.
89. We obtained DOAH docket information through October 15, 1996.  A longer observation pe-
riod enabled us to track time to resolution better for 1995 cases.  See infra, text following note 93.
90. Interviews were conducted during numerous site visits by the authors and others to Florida
and Virginia from February 1995 to April 1997, as well as by telephone.  We spoke most often with no-
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interviews, the focus was on general issues, but the administrators were some-
times asked to clarify other information about specific cases.  We also obtained
a sample of written opinions from DOAH and Workers’ Compensation hearing
officers.  In addition, official reports, financial statements, and some aggregate
data were obtained from both programs.
This article provides descriptive analyses about no-fault performance.  The
main focus is Florida, for which comparisons are drawn with similar tort cases.
Most results for Virginia are presented as footnotes, given the very small size of
the latter’s program, the lack of comparison tort data, and a rather erratic pat-
tern of filings.91  Analysis used cases brought through calendar year 1995, which
included almost all resolved cases and relatively few unresolved ones.92  Limited
quantitative data were added from interviews, notably on the nature of disputes
in each case.
Analysis often focuses on “mature” Florida experience, which is more rep-
resentative than early experience.  Any new program or insurance coverage can
be expected to undergo a shakedown period before settling into longer-run pat-
terns.  Administrators, claimants, and attorneys all face a learning curve in be-
ginning to deal with a new system.  Most fundamentally, it takes time for peo-
ple to learn even that a new program exists.  Prior research on health care
regulation found a difference in program effectiveness after the initial three
years.93  Moreover, early in NICA’s fourth year, administrative jurisdiction
shifted from Workers’ Compensation to DOAH.  For these reasons, Florida re-
sults from years one through three (filed 1989-92) are often distinguished from
the fourth year onward (filed 1993-95).  Analysis covers only cases brought be-
fore 1996, so that an additional six months of information could be gathered be-
fore the end of our observation period in mid-1996.  All years are calendar
years, as the programs both began on January first.
Comparison tort data come from the Florida closed claims data base, for
claims closed to June 1996. We selected as the most comparable comparison
group the universe of obstetrical tort cases that were “NICA-like,”94 but were
filed before 1989.95  Comparability was assessed on the basis of several attrib-
                                                          
fault administrators, but also with other officials, interest group representatives, and observers.  To
assure access and full cooperation, all interviewees were promised confidentiality and that we would
not quote them by name without their prior approval.
91. See infra Appendix A.
92. The small number of claims observed from the first half of 1996 had very incomplete informa-
tion.  Only one of the 11 Florida claims from 1996 was resolved by the end of our observation period,
and the single Virginia claim was unresolved.
93. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan & Bruce Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Input
Use, 80 J. POL. ECON. 107 (1980) (noting such a time-related difference in administrative performance
in an early analysis of regulatory “rate setting” for hospital prices).
94. Comparison cases were selected from among labor and delivery malpractice claims on the ba-
sis of being NICA-like according to the objective statutory criteria, using information from the 0-9
point severity of injury scale, descriptions of the injury, and allegations of negligence.  See Sloan et al.,
The No-Fault System for Obstetric Injury: Winners and Losers, OBSTET. & GYNECOL. (forthcoming).
95. For purposes of some comparisons and also to enlarge the size of the data set generally, we
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utes characteristic of NICA cases,96 including: permanent injury, incurred in the
delivery room, to a full term, live birth baby (as NICA does not cover any child
under 2500 grams or stillborns).  The closed claims were aggregated to the case
level using a matching algorithm.  An initial group of 138 claims was condensed
into 110 cases, each based on a single incident.
IV
FINDINGS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE
A. Number of Filings
The single most notable administrative attribute of these programs is their
very small scale (Table 1).  Both got off to a slow start. Florida’s first claim was
not filed until the second year of the program, and Virginia’s not until its third
year.  A slow start is unsurprising, for two reasons.  First is the shakedown pe-
riod noted above.97  Second is the usual lag between the occurrence of an injury,
its discovery, and the filing of any claim.98  In any given year most filings come
from injuries during prior years, and in no-fault’s first year there were no prior
years’ cases “in the pipeline.”  NICA applied to births beginning on January 1,
1989, allowing on average only six months for birth-related injuries to be de-
tected and brought as claims.  The second year’s filings included births from
two years, the third from three years, and so on.  In general, additional cases
continue to come in over time until the statute of limitations is reached.99
                                                          
also considered tort cases filed through 1991, but arising from births before NICA.  We stopped obser-
vation at the end of 1991 to allow five full years of “run off” for the tort claims to close, which, from
prior work, we know to include almost all claims.  It was inadvisable to include more recent years’ tort
filings, because larger and slower cases would disproportionately be excluded and because tort opera-
tions were expected to be affected by the existence of the parallel NICA remedy.
96. See supra note 94.
97. See supra text accompanying note 93.
98. No-fault proponents have suggested that no-fault should speed filings, but there is still a lag.
Results on speed of filing are presented in subsection C of this part.  See infra text following note 112.
99. This start-up period of NICA resembles the start-up of new liability coverage for physicians.
In the first year of any malpractice policy, very few claims are discovered and brought in that policy
year.  The older “occurrence” style policy nonetheless immediately charges a full premium because
insurers accrue the costs of anticipated future claims attributable to first-year incidents.  Coverage that
is sold on a “claims made” basis, in contrast, has very low premiums in its initial year, because only
claims made during the policy year must be paid from that year’s premiums.  Subsequent years’ premi-
ums cover later claims arising from earlier year incidents.  Claims made policies are considered
“mature” in the fifth year of continuous coverage when they reach occurrence policy levels, i.e., they
have reached a steady-state of claims flow and premiums, absent changes in underlying causative fac-
tors.  See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6-9 (1991).
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TABLE 1
NO-FAULT CLAIMS BY YEAR OF FILING
Florida NICA Virginia BIF
Claims Year Number Claims Year Number
1988 0
1989 0 1989 0
1990 6 1990 1
1991 18 1991 1
1992 26 1992 3
1993 33 1993 1
1994 42 1994 7
1995 60 1995 16
1996 11 1996 1
TOTAL 196 TOTAL 30
SOURCE:  NICA and BIF data.
NOTE:  1996 data through 5/15 (NICA), 5/31 (BIF)
As expected, Florida NICA filings increased steadily over time—from six
claims in 1990 to a high of sixty claims in 1995 (Table 1).  Virginia BIF filings
did not rise until 1994 and 1995, when they jumped to seven and sixteen claims.
Those two years contain three quarters of all claims from BIF’s first eight years.
Through 1995, NICA filings totaled 185, an average of twenty-six a year.  BIF
had thirty filings, fewer than four per year.100
In the long run, without significant legislative or administrative change,101
one expects a program to reach a steady state of filings per year that is related
to the underlying phenomena that generate injuries.  What, then, are the likely
steady-state sizes of NICA and BIF?  The best evidence on the underlying rate
of claims is the accumulated pattern of claims from each birth year (in contrast
to the filing year presentation of Table 1).  Appendix A presents claims by
years of birth and of filing in Appendix Tables A and B.  It confirms the lag in
filings noted above.  For each birth year, claims came in during many filing
years (for example, for 1989 Florida births, claims were made in every year
from 1990 through 1996).  Typically, there was a bulge in filings two years after
each birth year (for example, for 1989 births, the most common filing year was
1991).
The number of annual claims by birth year held much steadier over time
                                                          
100. As already noted, this small size leads us to present further BIF data only in footnotes.  Four
cases per year is not only a very low average, but Virginia’s program has also had an uneven pattern of
filings.  See Appendix A.
101. Virginia legislation made the eligibility criteria slightly less restrictive in 1990.  See supra note
44.  Significant Florida changes in claiming seem to have resulted from judicial decisions.  See infra
note 159 and accompanying text.
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than the pattern for filings, even in Virginia.  For most of its history, NICA
claims ranged from thirty-one to forty per birth year; BIF claims from three to
six.  Based on our observation period through 1995, these claims rates appear
to be the steady-state experience for each program operating under their
“mature” eligibility criteria and administrative processes.
Filings declined sharply in 1996, however, even after correcting for our ob-
servation of only half of that year (Table 1).102  Looking again at the data by
birth year, Appendix A suggests what may have happened:  Filings dropped for
births occurring in 1994-96 in both states, leading to lower filings for 1995-96.103
For example, whereas based on prior experience 1996 should have been the
prime year for filing claims from 1995 births, zero such claims were actually ob-
served in either state.104  This pattern suggests that our estimates of a long-term
annual caseload of thirty-one to forty in Florida and three to six in Virginia
may be too high.  Possible reasons for such a drop are discussed below.105
B. Nature of Disputes
Once filed, one expects NICA cases to be resolved differently according to
the type of issue that might lead to dispute.  Almost half of the NICA disputes
involved major issues of eligibility—severity of injury or causality (Table 2).
Such relatively complex issues seem at highest risk of causing a long and expen-
sive process.  Some seven percent more of the disputes involved significant
benefits issues, such as the nature, utilization, and price of services covered or
the amount of allowable attorneys’ fees.  The fee issue normally arises at the
very end of a case, after the attorney submits billings and justification, and can
lead to separate administrative proceedings.  Minor issues of eligibility that
should be resolvable with little difficulty accounted for another fifteen percent
of disputes, including claims against non-participating doctors, with birth
weight below the 2500 gram threshold, or filed by the wrong filer (by physician
rather than parent or guardian).  Finally, fully a quarter of NICA filings in-
volved no dispute at all, either because of prompt NICA approval or as the re-
sult of an agreement between NICA and the claimant to allow claimants to
withdraw without prejudice, subject to DOAH approval.  These withdrawals
                                                          
102. The decline was confirmed by more recent claims counts obtained for the preparation of this
paper from NICA Executive Director Dickinson and BIF Executive Director Pyles and updated in
February 1998.  Year-end totals show that there were 31 NICA claims filed in 1996 and 29 in 1997,
which supports the expectation of a drop-off in claims for births after 1993 and 1994 in Florida.  BIF
had 3 claims filed in 1996 and 12 in 1997, continuing its irregular experience.
103. When data are arrayed by birth year, one expects to see fewer claims late in the observation
period than for prior years, because claims totals are cumulative, and prior birth years have more
complete experience—more of their “run off” of claims subsequent to injury is actually observed.
Thus, for instance, viewed from 1996, the birth year 1990 is expected to have nearly complete data,
there having been six years after the average 1990 birth in which to bring claims.  For birth year 1995
as observed in 1996, however, many claims remain “in the pipeline.”  This phenomenon results from
claims lag, just like the rapid build up of claims filed in the early years of a program.  See supra note 99.
It is also why the text compares the second year after births rather than comparing cumulative totals
for 1995 with earlier years.
104. See Appendix Table A.
105. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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seldom occur with a hearing in the absence of an active dispute between NICA
and the claimant.  Voluntary withdrawal without prejudice allows a claimant to
re-file for benefits later.  This could be desirable for the plaintiff, for example,
in case an injury not yet shown severe enough to qualify becomes demonstrably
worse over time.
TABLE 2
NO-FAULT ISSUES IN DISPUTE:  ALL NICA CASES
1989-1991 1992-1995 Total
Issue(s) In Dispute No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage
Major Issues Of Eligibility
     Severity Of Injury 2 8 42 27 44 25
     Causality 7 28 39 25 46 26
Significant Benefit Issues
     Attorney Fees 4 16 5 3 9 5
     Coverage/Benefit Levels 2 8 2 1 4 2
Minor Issues Of Eligibility
     Birth Weight Too Low 1 4 10 7 11 6
     Non-Participating Doctor 0 0 15 10 15 8
     Wrong Filer 0 0 1 1 1 1
No Issue Disputed 9 36 39 25 48 27
TOTAL ISSUES 25 100 153 100 178 100
SOURCE:  NICA Executive Director
NOTE:  Cases have between 0 and 3 issues each; overall there are slightly fewer issues than cases.
We expected the number of less consequential disputes to decline over
time.  Plausibly, claiming should grow more accurate over time, as administra-
tors clarify their standards and claimants (as well as their lawyers) learn more
about what is required to succeed with a claim.  After all, losers get nothing
from NICA.  Despite these expectations, the proportion of claims over minor
issues has actually risen over time.106
Use of lawyers by claimants appears to be very high.  Except for recording
the amounts of payments made for successful claims, neither program keeps in-
formation on use of lawyers.  However, administrators indicated that many
people bring claims without a lawyer.  According to our survey of no-fault
claimant families,107 however, almost all went to an attorney first—100% in Vir-
ginia and 94% in Florida.108  Many survey interviewees also said that they first
                                                          
106. See Table 2.
107. See Kathryn Whetten-Goldstein et al., Compensation for Birth-Related Injury: No-Fault
Compared to Tort Systems (unpublished manuscript, on file with Randall Bovbjerg).
108. Project interviews covered a large share of claimants in each state—16 in Virginia (about half
of all claimants through mid-1996) and 79 in Florida (about 40%).  The interviewees appear to have
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heard about no-fault from their lawyer.  Moreover, according to administrative
interviews, claimants do not normally go to DOAH or Commission hearings
without a lawyer.
The proportion of cases receiving benefits varies between NICA and tort.
About half of NICA filings receive payment.109  Similarly, about half of general
malpractice claims receive compensation.110  However, for our comparable
Florida obstetrical tort cases, the payment percentage is even higher, fully sev-
enty percent.111  NICA’s lower percentage seems consistent with its lower cost
of access to dispute resolution.  Almost a third of claims are quickly resolved by
voluntary withdrawal, often without prejudice to future filing should an infant’s
injury over time prove severe enough to qualify for no-fault.112
C. Speed of Resolution
Time to resolution is presented in Table 3 for both NICA and comparable
tort cases.  Overall, NICA cases are resolved in about two thirds the time (at
the median) needed for tort, that is, more than a full year faster.  Most of the
difference is accounted for by paid cases.  The median or mean unpaid NICA
case takes nearly as long from injury to resolution as its tort counterpart.113  For
NICA, unpaid cases resolve more slowly than paid ones, possibly reflecting the
                                                          
been representative of the entire populations of claimants.  See Whetten-Goldstein et al., supra note
107, at 6.
109. See Table 3.
110. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 42 (1985) (stating that, of claims closed nationally, mainly from the mid 1970s, about half
closed with payment); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (1987) (citing national data that 43% of claimed closed in
1984 received payment); Bovbjerg & Petronis, supra note 87, at 1423 tbl.1 (showing that, of Florida
claims closed between 1975 and 1983, 40% of those with a named claimant received some payment).
111. These percentages are not exactly comparable because of the differences between the data
bases from which they are calculated.  Only one NICA claim can result from each birth, which is either
paid or not.  Tort “cases” as we present them, in contrast, can involve multiple defendants.  Presenta-
tion of tort results by case rather than claim increased the payment percentage.  For example, if both
obstetrician and hospital are sued, even if only one claim results in payment, the per-case payment
percentage is 100%, whereas per claim is 50%.  On the other hand, the tort payment percentage may
understate the true per-case payment percentage because it is calculated from closed-claim data.
Some unknown share of our tort cases may have companion claims still open that will be paid after our
observation period.
112. Also, some NICA claims appear to be brought as part of litigation strategy.  See infra note 170.
113. Both sets of data somewhat understate the true length of time to resolution.  Some observed
NICA cases are known to be still open, and some tort cases can be presumed to involve related claims
against additional defendants.  See supra note 111.  Tort cases were considered opened at the earliest
date of claim against any defendant, and date of resolution is that of the last closed against any defen-
dant, both tabulated at the date reported by the insurer or self insurer submitting the closed-claims re-
port.  Tort closure is the date of final settlement or judicial decree, even where a “structured” financial
award pays out future losses under an annuity or other scheduled basis.  Paid NICA cases were consid-
ered resolved at the time of first payment of benefits (typically, the parental award), which occasion-
ally can occur before administrative processes and judicial appeals are completed.  For closed but un-
paid NICA cases, the date is that of the final administrative-judicial action.  For open and unpaid
cases, resolution is deemed to be the date of last significant action.  Some cases appear to be aban-
doned in that there is no administrative action for some time; for these, we coded last date rather than
end of observation period.
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influence of some long disputes over open cases.  For tort, the reverse holds
true, possibly because of the predominance of cases quickly discovered to be
unlikely to recover and hence abandoned with little or no formal judicial ac-
tion.
TABLE 3
SPEED OF RESOLUTION:  NICA VERSUS TORT
Calendar Days From Incident To Claims Resolution
Florida NICA Cases 1989-1995
Status        (# Cases) 5%ile Median 95%ile Mean
Paid           (94) 206 810 1680 850
Not Paid    (91) 440 1151 2267 1229
Total               (185) 316 899 2107 1036
Comparable Tort Cases 1984-1991
Status        (# Cases) 5%ile Median 95%ile Mean
Paid           (77) 428 1361 2441 1348
Not Paid   (33) 771 1220 2505 1428
Total               (110) 630 1322 2441 1372
SOURCES: NICA administrative data; Florida closed-claims database
Under no-fault, one expects both faster filing (because of simpler standards
and less adversarial “stonewalling” of discovery) and faster resolution (also be-
cause of simpler standards as well as simplified administrative processes).  To
see what happened in Florida, Table 4 separates total time to resolution into
two separate components: (1) from incident (birth) to filing, and (2) from filing
to resolution.  Table 4 shows that there are notable differences in delays before
and after filing in the two systems.  NICA and tort are very similar in time from
injury to filing, but very different in time from filing to resolution.  This differ-
ence is most directly attributable to administrators’ actions or inactions.
Claims under NICA take almost exactly the same time to be filed as under tort.
In the early periods, the median time to filing was 632 days for all NICA cases,
versus 651 for tort.  Both systems had slower filing in the more recent cases
(medians of 766 and 726).  NICA thus shows no advantage over tort in ease of
discovery or filing.
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TABLE 4
SPEED OF FILING AND OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS:
NICA VERSUS TORT
EARLY EXPERIENCE MORE CURRENT EXPERIENCE
(NICA: 1989-1991; (NICA: 1992-1995;
COMPARABLE TORT: 1984-1988) COMPARABLE TORT: 1989-1991)
(1) Time From Incident To Filing (In Calendar Days)
(No. Cases) Median Mean (No. Cases) Median Mean
NICA
Paid (29) 625 526 (65) 766 807
Not
  Paid (21) 709 663 (70) 760 877
TOTAL (50) 632 584 (135) 766 844
TORT
Paid (60) 609 589 (17) 720 665
Not
  Paid (27) 746 727 (6) 840 775
TOTAL (87) 651 632 (23) 726 694
(2) Time From Filing To Resolution (In Calendar Days)
(No. Cases) Median Mean (No. Cases) Median Mean
NICA
Paid (29) 114 174 (65) 60 110
Not
  Paid (21) 681 728 (70) 264 303
TOTAL (50) 207 407 (135) 148 210
TORT
Paid (60) 685 790 (17) 542 577
Not
  Paid (27) 555 680 (6) 640 743
TOTAL (87) 661 756 (23) 591 620
SOURCES: NICA administrative data; Florida closed-claims database
Once filed, however, NICA cases are resolved much faster than tort cases,
particularly in NICA’s more recent, relatively mature phase.  NICA cut median
time from filing to resolution from the early experience of 114 days to only 60
for paid cases, and from 681 to 264 for unpaid cases.  Measured as means,
NICA speed also increased, but by lesser amounts.  Tort speeds are slower in
nearly every comparison, and although tort speed from filing to resolution also
dropped over time, it dropped by much lesser amounts.  NICA’s speed advan-
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tage after filing has thus increased substantially in more recent experience.114
D. Administrative Costs
Overall, NICA carries substantially lower “overhead” costs for benefits
payments, compared with comparable tort cases (Table 5).115  Whereas nearly
half of total tort costs go to expenses of dispute resolution (46.9%),116 we esti-
mate that NICA’s administrative costs account for only 10.3% of total NICA
spending, leaving almost ninety percent for benefits (payments to date plus re-
serves for future payments).  In average dollars per case, NICA is able to de-
liver $486,000 in benefits for only $55,000 in administrative cost, while tort pro-
vides $399,000 in benefits at an administrative cost of $352,000.117
The biggest single source of savings under NICA is claimants’ lawyers fees
and expenses, which are a tiny fraction of comparable tort legal fees (one per-
cent versus twenty-seven percent of totals).118  Defense costs (attorneys fees and
                                                          
114. Virginia data also show slow filing and prompt no-fault resolution.  Virginia cases were
brought very slowly—only two in the program’s first four years, then fully 16 in 1995, then few again in
1997.  The average time to filing was 1216 days (the median was 1139), or nearly three and a half
years, even longer than Florida’s medians of about two years.  See Table 4.  The time from filing to
resolution was astonishingly fast in Virginia—only 69 days on average for paid cases, 127 for unpaid,
for an overall average of 96 days, or only three months (the median was 72)—faster even than Flor-
ida’s 148-day median for current experience.  See id.  The three fastest cases were resolved only 8, 10,
and 12 calendar days after filing.  We are uncertain about the strict accuracy or interpretation of coded
information on dates, however.  For reasons noted above, we did not seek to resolve such technical
analysis-file-construction issues for this data set.
115. The costs in Table 5 are computed as total system cost, averaged per case, whether paid or un-
paid.  Data for NICA are for 1989-95, for comparable tort cases, for 1984-91.  NICA data are all from
the program, and DOAH costs are imputed from volume 19 of Florida’s FINAL BUDGET REPORT AND
TEN-YEAR SUMMARY OF APPROPRIATIONS DATA, 1987-88 THROUGH 1996-97 (Oct. 1, 1996).  Tort
benefits and legal expense data come from the Florida closed-claims data base for comparable NICA-
like cases.  Plaintiff attorneys’ fees are estimated at 33% of indemnity payment. Insurer overhead and
profit are a malpractice insurer average from BEST’S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES 200 (1994).
Court costs are based on the estimate of JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986).  Court costs are assumed to account for the same
percentage loading for expensive obstetrics cases as for the much smaller average case in the tort sys-
tem at large.  The NICA court cost is estimated to be the same as that for tort cases, although a far
lower percentage of NICA cases than tort cases are taken to court.
116. Although most of the cost elements of Table 5 are computed with Florida-specific data on
NICA-like cases, administrative cost totals are very similar to those previously computed for the tort
system generally.  See KAKALIK & PACE, supra note 115, at 74 fig.7.2.
117. We also examined data from Virginia on total benefit payouts through May 1996.  Of the 29
Virginia cases filed through 1995, 23 were paid by the end of our observation period in mid-1996 (79%,
as opposed to 51% in Florida), at an average cumulative amount (undiscounted) of $116,400.  The
Virginia data cover only spending to date.  BIF does not create reserves for future claims payments.
Thus, it understates ultimate benefits spending relative to Florida’s NICA or for tort settlements.  Cu-
riously, three cases found eligible had received no payments for a year or more, in at least one instance
because the infant was hospitalized with all expenses being met, according to the Virginia executive
director.
118. Brown’s analysis of Virginia tort claims in 1980-89 found similarly high levels of attorney pay-
ment in paid tort suits.  There, 38% of loss payments went to attorneys in cases of surviving infants
(There were 31 paid claims, 20 for survivors and 11 for decedents).  See Barbara S. Brown, Birth-
Injured Infants: Claims Frequency and Costs in Virginia 1980-1988, tbl.6 (undated manuscript done for
state estimation purposes by Williamson Institute for Health Studies, Medical College of Virginia, on
file with Randall Bovbjerg).  The comparable ratio for our Florida tort data is 50%.  See Table 5
(26.6%/53.1%).
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other allocated loss expense) are also much lower for NICA (one percent ver-
sus six percent).119
TABLE 5
NICA AND TORT COST COMPARISON
(AVERAGE 1995 DOLLARS PER CASE AND PERCENTAGE SHARES)
Category Of
Expense
Ave.
 $/Case
%Of
Tot.
Category Of
Expense
Ave.
$/Case
%Of
Tot.
NICA Admin $55,549 10.3 Tort Admin $351,837 46.9
   Courts & DOAH $17,688 3.3    Courts $15,018 2.0
     Courts $12,823
      DOAH Claims
        Administration
$4,865
   NICA Overhead $24,068 4.4    Insurer Overhead $95,664 12.7
   Claimant Legal Expense $6,489 1.2    Plaintiff Legal $199,530 26.6
   NICA Legal Expense For
     Claims
$7,304 1.3    Defense Legal (LAE) $41,625 5.5
NICA Benefits $486,324 89.7 Tort Benefits $399,061 53.1
   Payments Made $45,852 8.5    Payments, Net
   Reserves Held $440,472 81.3       Of Attorney $399,061
NICA Total $541,873 Tort Total $750,898
SOURCES: NICA admin data, Florida closed-claims data, Florida budget data, Kakalik & Pace
(1985), Best's & Co. (1995)
NOTE: Dollars adjusted to 1995 values by CPI; NICA 1990-95, N = 185; comparable tort 1984-91,
N = 108; LAE = loss adjustment expense; plaintiff legal estimated at 1/3 of indemnity payment
It might be argued that the exact percentage “loading” of administrative
costs is quite sensitive to the level of reserves for future benefits and related
costs, which far exceed program cash outlays to date.120  Fiscal conservatism
might lead the program to over-reserve to reduce the risk of going over
budget.121  Any such systematic over-reserving would make the administrative
cost rate shown in Table 5 lower than the true rate.
                                                          
119. These expensive obstetrical injuries pay far more to the plaintiffs’ attorneys than to the de-
fense bar, whereas, for non-automobile tort as a whole, the two account for very similar shares of
spending.  See KAKALIK & PACE, supra note 115, at 74 fig. 7.2 (showing that plaintiffs’ legal costs are
20% of the total, and those of defense 18%).
120. See Table 5.
121. See Schulte, supra note 39, at 3 (noting a “conservative reserving practice” of not fully dis-
counting to the level estimated by the actuarial report).  With regard to matching future claims costs
with future expenses, a more refined comparison might judgmentally adjust administrative costs by
adding a projection for ongoing claims administration for cases already reserved.  The goal would be to
accrue future expenses to match present reserves for benefits payments.  In NICA practice and the
presentation of Table 5, reserves cover both expected future benefits and future claims-related admin-
istrative costs.  There is no obvious and principled way to generate from current data reliable estimates
of future claims costs that match the future benefits included as reserves, however, and the affected
amounts seem small.
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The basic finding of much lower NICA administrative costs nonetheless
seems strong, for several reasons.  Qualitatively, it is notable that NICA ad-
ministrative practice periodically has the program’s main consulting physician
estimate each covered infant’s remaining lifetime.  He reviews written records
on development as well as videotapes of each infant made, in part, for this pe-
riod.122  Moreover, the program’s consultant actuaries review and have ap-
proved Florida’s reserving practice, and there is some suggestive evidence from
a companion study that NICA costs are quite close to researchers’ estimated
five-year costs for these severely injured children.123
Most importantly for consideration of administrative performance, NICA’s
payout percentage will surpass that of tort even if the program eventually
proves to have greatly over-reserved for future losses.  In order for the esti-
mated $56,000 in administrative costs per NICA case (now only ten percent of
total spending with reserves) to be found as high as the forty-seven tort per-
centage, current reserves would have to be judged seven times too high.124  This
degree of over-reserving seems quite implausible.125
Also, NICA payouts differ markedly from previous awards for malpractice
claims in services covered.  Of actual dollars paid out through mid-May 1996
for cases filed by the end of December 1995, two thirds of payments have con-
sisted of the parental allowance of up to $100,000 per case, almost twenty per-
cent have consisted of medical payments, nine percent have been for non-
medical goods and services, and less than four percent have consisted of ad-
ministrative costs, mainly compensability exam testing.126  For the more recent
period, the percentage accounted for by the parental payments is even higher,
as the allowance is paid early, whereas medical and other bills continue to ac-
crue over time.  Typically, the allowance is not paid in cash, as such assets
would make recipient families ineligible for social security disability and Medi-
caid, which are far more valuable.127  The administrative data lack information
                                                          
122. See also Whetten-Goldstein et al., supra note 107.
123. See id. at tbl.3.
124. These figures are calculated from data in Table 5.  Current NICA administrative cost is
$55,549, now 10.3% of total spending with reserves at the actual level of $440,472.  To reduce this per-
centage to the tort level of 46.7%, reserves would have to be cut by $377,580 or 85.7%.
125. Recall also that estimated NICA court costs were simply estimated at tort levels, although
they are arguably lower, given that most fact finding occurs at the administrative level.  Part of any
over-reserving that might affect the denominator of the administrative cost percentage is offset by this
potential over-estimate of a cost in the numerator.
126. This information comes from NICA data and is not presented in a table.
127. Different cash or other assets ceilings (and exclusions of particular types of property, such as
homes) apply under different programs.  Two major programs are Medicaid and Social Security dis-
ability.  See generally COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1996
GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1-115, 879-914 (1996).  The ceilings range from about one
thousand to several thousand dollars, nationally.  Possessing too many assets can be quite costly in
foregone benefits.  For example, blind or disabled Florida recipients of Medicaid each received aver-
age medical benefits of $4,251 in 1990 and $5,767 in 1995.  NICA recipients can expect to receive much
more, as they are far more profoundly disabled than average.  See Debra J. Lipson et al., Health Policy
for Low-Income People in Florida 15 tbl.4 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute paper, July 1997)
(accessible at <http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/reports.html>).
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on amounts paid by “collateral” sources, but our parental interviews suggest
that it is considerable.128
Finally, NICA’s legal and other claims-associated costs dropped markedly
after the first three years, from an average of nearly $30,000 to under $3,000 per
case.129  In the belief that this phenomenon was driven by the very extreme out-
liers of high-cost cases, we examined all cases with legal expenses over
$100,000,130 of which there were six.  All but one of these high-cost cases were
filed in the first twenty months of claims, among the first fifteen filings.131  The
last one came in the fifth year of operations, among the second 100 NICA fil-
ings.  Most are landmark cases that set precedent for NICA operations, al-
though most also involved fact-based disputes and ongoing disputes over the
appropriateness and cost of benefits requested.  All but one are paid cases, and
benefits issues and attorneys’ fees caused the most disputes.132  Also unlike the
typical case, all the high-cost cases involved significant legal process.  Five be-
gan in Workers’ Compensation, and most of these had disputes continue over
to DOAH’s assumption of jurisdiction in May 1993.133  Although similar bene-
fits disputes can occur at any time under an ongoing program, disputes of this
magnitude seem likely to be rare past the first few years.134
E. Nature of Administrative Process
There was generally little disagreement between NICA administrators and
the ultimate resolution of cases by the DOAH administrative law judge or the
civil court judge on appeal.  Over 1989-95, only five to six percent of NICA
recommendations on eligibility (whether to accept or reject a claim) were coun-
termanded by DOAH or appeals judges.  There was no difference between the
early and the more mature pattern.135
Relatively few NICA cases go to hearing, and fewer still to judicial appeal.136
                                                          
128. See Whetten-Goldstein et al., supra note 107, tbl.3 (For paid NICA claims to claimant age five,
NICA paid an average of $123,121 out of $200,205 estimated total expenses.  For unpaid claims, NICA
paid zero of $198,433 average family costs, and non-tort sources of payment accounted for 62% of the
total.).
129. These figures are calculated from NICA administrative data.  They are not presented in a ta-
ble.
130. See Appendix B.
131. That is, they were filed in August 1991 or before, in NICA’s third year, but the second year in
which the program received claims.  See Table 1.
132. The cases also all involved very severe injury, even for NICA.  This impression from the writ-
ten record is confirmed by the NICA Executive Director and by the fact that four of the five paid cases
received the maximum parental award of $100,000.  For the other, the micro-data entry is missing.
The sixth was not a paid case.
133. Of the high-cost cases listed in Appendix B, cases A-E all started under Workers’ Compensa-
tion.  Only case F was filed after the 1993 transfer of no-fault authority to DOAH.
134. To test the possibility that we could be misled by the “round number” cut-off of $100,000 used
to select cases, we quickly examined the nine next biggest administrative cases for a total of 15.  Their
legal costs were smaller, but still well above even the early average of $30,000.  Like the top six, the
top 15 were predominantly early cases, almost all starting under the jurisdiction of Workers’ Compen-
sation.
135. These data from DOAH docket records are not presented as a table.
136. This information was abstracted from the DOAH docket books, and is not presented as a ta-
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Overall, only twenty-eight percent (51 of 185) of our observed universe of cases
had any hearing at all.  Only a few had two or more hearings.137  There were
twenty judicial appeals (eleven percent).  The balance accepted non-eligibility
before hearing or the final DOAH ruling without appeal.  There was little dif-
ference in this regard between early and recent cases.
Returning to qualitative information, note that both BIF and NICA operate
on a very informal basis.  Both programs have promulgated the formal plans of
operation called for by their statutes.  These plans, however, cover broad op-
erational issues rather than specific standards to guide claimants and facilitate
consistency of program determinations.138  The applicable state regulations are
those of the final administrative authorities—Workers’ Compensation and
DOAH.  As noted above, the programs are not subject to Administrative Pro-
cedure Acts, and they have not promulgated formal rules or guidelines.  For
example, there are no written standards governing what constitutes a
“permanently and severely” injured infant in Florida.  Nor do rules specify ex-
actly what types of services are covered under what circumstances, or just how
to determine what fraction of the maximum $100,000 parental award should be
allowed for what extent of injury.139  Instead, the programs have relied on case-
by-case development of administrative “common law” to elaborate upon the
basic statutory provisions.  Thus, claimants or their lawyers in search of quick
answers have no “codification” of no-fault practice to which to refer.
Each no-fault case is investigated on its own merits, relying upon medical
and other experts to inform the common sense of program administrators.
Program directors and board members think that this approach is consistent
with the statutory intent to depart from the formal adversary process of litiga-
tion and even of Workers’ Compensation proceedings for initial investigation.
Developing rules through experience also makes sense because there was little
relevant precedent upon which these very first no-fault operating systems could
draw and because their very small scope of operations militated against trying
to develop comprehensive rules before starting up.  The case-by-case approach
to decision rules does have the defects of its virtues, however.  Notably from an
                                                          
ble.
137. The DOAH dockets only list hearings that may result in a judicial order.  Lawyers’ presenta-
tions in the course of discovery or requests for pre-hearing rulings are not entered.  The DOAH in-
formation may undercount proceedings at Workers’ Compensation during the initial years of NICA, as
those data were entered as a matter of historical record rather than as ongoing conduct of DOAH
business.
138. In this article, we do not examine the accuracy or consistency of determinations.  However,
Sloan et al., supra note 73, show that determinations correlate well with relatively simple, objective
decision standards based on the statutes.  Medical experts blindly reviewing no-fault, tort, and no claim
cases also found patterns of differences across those classes of cases that support consistency.  Cases in
each class are more like one another than like members of the other classes, and the number of medi-
cal errors observed in medical records rose linearly from no claim, to no-fault, to tort cases.
139. As late as the end of our observation period, the definition of “permanently and severely” was
still being determined on a case-by-case basis by NICA consultants.  See, e.g., Deposition of Michael
Duchowny, M.D., in Walsh v. Florida Birth Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n 8-9 (taken May
16, 1996, filed with DOAH June 12, 1996).
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efficiency standpoint, it fails to generalize knowledge about the programs as
well as access to them, particularly where the systems lack the scope to foster
the development of a specialized bar that would provide expertise about pro-
gram operating procedures and rules in the absence of written standards.
V
DISCUSSION: THREE MAIN FINDINGS AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Three findings stand out: the programs’ very small size, their efficiency
(high speed of resolution and low administrative cost), and the informality of
their operations.  These findings are discussed in turn, then the conclusion con-
siders their implications for broader no-fault programs.
A. Size
The Virginia and Florida no-fault programs are clearly very small, having
received just over 220 cases between them in eight years of operations.  The
key policy issue here is whether the programs are small by legislative design or
as an unintended side-effect of administrative implementation.140  The statutes
intentionally create very limited “carve outs” from the tort system for a prob-
lematic subset of very severe injuries. Virginia has somewhat more than half as
many births per year as Florida,141 and Virginia’s no-fault statute is even more
limited than Florida’s,142 so one expects a smaller program in Virginia.  Vir-
ginia’s program is indeed smaller, only a sixth as large, an extreme difference in
magnitude.  Similarly, Virginia received more filings after loosening its stan-
dards somewhat.143  This result is also in the expected direction, although the
pattern of filings in Virginia is irregular and hard to extrapolate or interpret.144
As to whether BIF and NICA reached their target populations, consider
first the legislative expectations.  Projections at the time of legislative action
were for much higher annual caseloads, some forty in Virginia and sixty in
Florida.145  However, those projections may have been intentionally made on
the high side, so as to yield conservative budget estimates.  Both legislatures
were quite concerned that their programs be affordable within the legislated as-
sessments.146  Moreover, expectations have changed with the development of
                                                          
140. Public policy implementation often differs from legislative goals, and “unintended conse-
quences” are a common focus of policy literature.  See, e.g., JEFFREY PRESSMAN & AARON
WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1984).
141. In 1992, there were 97,198 live births in Virginia and 191,713 in Florida.  See U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 75 (1995).  No-fault filings of about 40
a year thus amount to about two thousandths of one percent of births in Florida, which has the larger
program.
142. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
144. See Table 1 and Appendix A.
145. See Tedcastle & Dewar, supra note 8, at 584, n.374; White, supra note 8, at 1490, n.16.  Given
that Florida has nearly double the number of Virginia’s births per year as well as a less restrictive no-
fault definition, it is interesting that the ratio of expected beneficiaries was only 60:40.
146. See Davis & Kramer, supra note 12; Tedcastle & Dewar, supra note 8, at 583 n.364; White, su-
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additional scientific evidence on the share of neurological birth injuries caused
by medical care as against other factors, including genetics and conditions dur-
ing pregnancy.  The expected level of birth-related injury is thus lower than was
widely thought in the mid-1980s when these programs were conceived.147  For
these reasons, we expected that the programs, as implemented over time,
would not meet original legislative expectations.
As another comparison, we estimated the annual number of births with
cerebral palsy (“CP”) in Florida.  CP cases are a major contributor to severe
neurological impairment, though more than half of CP cases involve lesser
conditions.148  Our estimate is about 500—at least ten times higher than our es-
timated long-run annual rate of NICA filings.149  Another point of comparison
is the number of birth-related negligent injuries in Florida, estimated at roughly
1000 a year.150  One would expect only a fraction of negligent events or CP cases
to involve the very severe injuries needed to qualify for NICA, but even these
universes of possible NICA cases are far larger than actual NICA filings per
year.
A final comparison is to similar tort filings.  NICA filings are substantially
more numerous than comparable tort claims,151 even without any adjustment to
                                                          
pra note 8.  Another indication of fiscal conservatism is the Florida requirement that NICA claims re-
serves be kept to cover the maximum possible parental award.  See supra note 64.
147. See generally JOHN WITREDGE WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 991 (20th ed. 1997)
(Chapter 44, Diseases and Injuries of the Fetus and Newborn Infant); Karen B. Nelson & J. H. Ellen-
berg, Antecedents of Cerebral Palsy: The Multivariate Analysis of Risk, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 81
(1986).  Casual observation suggests that this shift in scientific evidence, and hence in the expert opin-
ion on which tort law relies, has made it less difficult to defend malpractice claims of severe birth-
related neurological injury.  This may well have lessened the political support for the no-fault pro-
grams.  No other state has emulated Virginia or Florida.
148. CP estimates derive from our review of the literature about cerebral palsy, concluding that
about one quarter of one percent of cases are caused by medical care as opposed to other causative
factors.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 147.  Earlier estimates of the incidence of CP were higher.
In sum, it is now believed that the share of CP cases caused by medical care is much lower than many
people believed when these statutes were debated.  See Nelson & Ellenberg, supra note 147, at 81.
149. See supra text accompanying note 105.  These figures would be more disproportionate if a re-
duction to the filing rate were made for clearly erroneous NICA filings such as claims for birth weights
of under 2500 grams.  See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.  Moreover, according to the program
director, an unquantified share of NICA filings do not appear to be “serious,” in that they apparently
do not seek recovery, but rather a ruling that NICA does not apply, so as to eliminate any NICA de-
fense in the subsequent tort claim.
150. The best estimate is that the rate of negligent adverse events for newborns is 0.6%, as found in
hospitals’ medical records by the Harvard Medical Practice Study.  See PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND
LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW
YORK 6-23, tbl. 6.6 (1990).
151. NICA-comparable tort claims for 1984-91 totaled 108, or about 12 per year.  See supra note 96.
NICA’s long-run rate is estimated at 30-40 per year.  See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
NICA’s actual average for the first eight years was 26, based on a total of 216, 185 for 1989-95, plus 31
for 1996.  See supra Table 1 and text following note 99.  In Virginia, however, there have been only
three or four BIF cases per year, see Table 1 and Appendix A, as against about eight comparable tort
cases per year in the pre-no-fault period.  See Barbara S. Brown, Birth-Injured Infants: Claims Fre-
quency and Costs in Virginia 1980-1988, tbl.1 (undated manuscript done for state estimation purposes
by Williamson Institute for Health Studies, Medical College of Virginia, on file with Randall Bovbjerg)
(noting 78 claims from 1980 through 1989, counting both open and closed claims from five insurers that
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the higher mature filings rate for NICA.152
On balance, it appears that some substantial number of potentially eligible
no-fault-like cases remain unfiled for various reasons, even after many years of
program operations.  Just why the rate of filing is lower than expected is a mat-
ter of some conjecture on which there is no direct evidence,153 but several fac-
tors may relate to low claiming rates:
(1) Case finding and reporting relies almost exclusively upon claimant initia-
tive, and some potential claimants may not come forward.  Although both pro-
grams will help potential claimants prepare their filings if asked, it appears that
potential claimants normally go to attorneys instead.  Considerations favoring
use of lawyers include the expense of getting records and the difficulty of de-
ciding whether to sue or to file in no-fault.154  Moreover, the administrative re-
ality is that such small programs necessarily operate only from offices in each
capital city, whereas lawyers and their referral networks cover the entire
state.155
(2) Program outreach to possible claimant populations has been limited.
Despite the huge number of births per year, neither program has directly
sought to educate mothers or families.  Both have relied principally upon medi-
cal providers to hand out program brochures about no-fault.  The brochures are
printed in very large quantities, and revised over time to improve readability.
However, they are distributed mainly to participating physicians.  There is no
continuing formal outreach to CP specialists, for example, nor to parents’ self-
help groups, although both directors sometimes give talks to some patient or
provider groups.
(3) The persistence of a tort remedy also seems influential.  These programs
constitute a very limited carve-out approach to no-fault, with mainly voluntary
participation.  As a consequence, there are naturally many “boundary” issues
that can be litigated.  Claimants often go directly to court, especially in Flor-
ida.156  Indeed, Florida courts have begun to rule on NICA eligibility, taking
evidence and finding facts judicially, without any need to exhaust administra-
                                                          
insured 94% of the physician market).  No directly comparable number of tort cases since BIF is avail-
able.  Our project survey of families found that many filed a tort case either before or after bringing a
BIF claim.  See Sloan et al., supra note 73.
152. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
153. This project surveyed claimants in tort and no-fault, see Sloan et al., supra note 73, because
these claimants had important information, they were relatively inexpensive to find, a sample frame
was available, and there was program support to do so.  Funding and other support for surveying a
broad sample of injured infants was not available.  One might start, for example, from medical clinics
that see many CP patients or from health insurance or Medicaid data.  In both states, there was con-
cern that any such survey could foment claiming, both in tort and in no-fault.  Similar concerns faced
the Harvard Medical Practice Study, which obtained special confidentiality protections from the state
before proceeding.  See supra note 150.
154. See Sloan et al., supra note 73, for a discussion of the reasons.
155. By the end of our observation period, both BIF and NICA had obtained toll-free telephone
numbers, which should improve claimant access to program advice.
156. See Sloan et al., supra note 73, at 46-63.  Not only do many claimants bypass NICA, some of
those in NICA appear to be there for tort-related strategic reasons.  See supra note 76.
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tive remedies.157  In April 1996, just before the end of the observation period,
the state supreme court upheld the authority of trial courts to make these de-
terminations judicially rather than administratively.158  Therefore, in Florida,
the statutory language about NICA exclusivity does not mean exclusivity as to
fact finding or to decisionmaking on eligibility, but only to exclusivity in the
provision of benefits in eligible cases.  Conversely, Florida courts are not lim-
ited to judicial review of administrative fact finding or to questions of law.
An even more significant judicial interpretation of the NICA-DOAH ad-
ministrative role came in May 1997, when the supreme court ruled that NICA’s
carve-out from tort was dependent upon a tort defendant’s ability to prove to a
judge or jury that actual notice of NICA’s exclusivity was given to a plaintiff
before delivery, approving appellate reasoning that the purpose of notice is to
allow a prospective parent to decide whether to change doctors.159  Just how
these decisions will be applied in litigation is not yet clear.  No more apparent is
just how many additional plaintiffs may opt for court over NICA; plausibly,
these test cases had some influence on the downturn in NICA filings for early
1996.160  Also, the small size of NICA coupled with these prior losses in court
may make it harder for NICA to defend itself in any future constitutional
challenge than it would have been at the onset of the program.161
(4) Incentives of administrators and claimant attorneys may also play a role.
The programs have a statutory duty to pay valid claims, and their executives
clearly show great compassion for injured claimants.  Still, the economic incen-
tives for program administration created by the requirements to maintain fiscal
                                                          
157. See, e.g., Central Florida Reg’l Hosp. v. Wager, 656 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Central Florida Reg’l Hosp. v. Wager, 672 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1996).
158. See Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass’n v. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d
974, 979 (Fla. 1996).  However, plaintiffs who argue that they are not covered under NICA face two
practical disincentives.  First, the statute of limitations for tort is tolled during an administrative pro-
ceeding, but the administrative statute of limitations is not tolled during a tort litigation.  Second, to
stay in tort, a plaintiff’s attorney must explain to the judge why the alleged injury is not NICA-eligible
(i.e., that it is either not birth-related, permanent, and severe, or an impairment both mental and
physical).  Making this argument over a defense claim of NICA eligibility would seem to preclude sub-
sequent action under NICA, as well as to limit claims for damages.  See supra note 76.
159. See Galen v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309-10 (Fla. 1997).  The notice issue is somewhat analo-
gous to informed consent in the malpractice context.  However, the courts appear not to discuss the
issue of whether an obstetrical patient claiming lack of notice must further demonstrate that she her-
self or a reasonable patient would in fact have changed providers based on improved knowledge, as an
informed consent plaintiff needs to show that a reasonable patient would have foregone a medical pro-
cedure if better informed about risks and alternatives.  If and when courts reach this issue, they seem
likely to have to consider that few patients change doctors and that those wishing to do so would dis-
cover that the overwhelming majority of obstetricians participate in NICA.
160. Lower claiming levels seem to have continued after our observation period ended in mid-1996.
See supra note 102.  The percentage going to tort first is already substantial.  See Sloan et al., supra
note 73.
161. We were unable to study the extent of “leakage” of NICA cases to tort because no data are
available on current tort filings to compare with NICA.  See generally Sloan et al., supra note 73.  It is
too early for detailed use of administrative data to study changes in tort and tort-NICA inter-relations
in the post-no-fault era, especially past the early NICA era of 1989-91.  Claims are observable from
time of opening in NICA, but only closed tort claims are available for study, and these take some years
to close.  See supra Tables 3 and 4.
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solvency reward stringency rather than generosity.162  Supplementing this effect
is an overall climate that emphasizes tort reform over no-fault goals, and the
reliance upon medical providers for funding.163
For their part, trial lawyers considering whether to go to court or to NICA
for recovery have a clear economic incentive to choose tort.  In tort, there is of-
ten the potential for a reputation-enhancing large award, even though total
payouts from NICA over time may ultimately average nearly as much and
sometimes more than could be won in court.  Additionally, there is constant
awareness that winning cases bring far higher fees from tort than from NICA.164
Lawyers’ fees in tort are a customary one third of recovery, whereas no-fault
approves only hourly billings, only in paid cases, and subject to administrative
review.165  Several observers report that attorneys handling NICA cases over-
whelmingly come from the trial bar, not from specialists in administrative cases
including Workers’ Compensation.
Finally, two potential caveats about the size of the programs deserve men-
tion.  First, it has been hypothesized that even seven or eight years is not long
enough to project long-term trends under current operations because the trial
lawyers who handle so many of these cases may be keeping eligible cases “in a
drawer.”166  Postponing a no-fault filing for a severely injured newborn may
make some sense if a constitutional or other judicial challenge may eventually
succeed, making it possible to bring a tort suit even in cases that appear to fall
within BIF or NICA.  Delay in seeking recovery could be ethical and in the cli-
ent’s interest where the likely tort recovery is far higher than could be obtained
under no-fault, even discounted for delayed payment in tort, and important
medical or other services are not being delayed for want of funds that no-fault
might provide.  Neither state has yet had a reported constitutional challenge on
the merits.167
We have some suggestive evidence of anomalous variations in patterns of
                                                          
162. NICA’s administration sees itself as “[c]harged with administering claims, running an efficient
organization and maintaining an actuarially sound fund,” Lynn Dickinson, Professional Liability in
Florida, MIAMI MEDICINE, Mar. 1993, at 21, not with finding all valid claims that may occur, which
would probably threaten NICA’s solvency, as argued in the text.
163. NICA administration, for example, strongly resisted an expansionary DOAH interpretation of
its eligibility criteria, in the Birnie litigation.  See infra note 177.
164. See Table 5.
165. Both states review submitted fees under the general, discretionary approach established by
state compensation law.  See, e.g., Acebo v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n,
Case No. 93-3000N (State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, May 20, 1994) (applying
the ruling of Florida Patient Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)).
166. Professor Walter Wadlington of the University of Virginia Law School has often emphasized
this possibility, most recently at the conference at which this paper was presented, in informal remarks
after the no-fault presentation at the IMPACS/Duke Medical Malpractice Conference (Sept. 13, 1997).
167. Only the constitutionality of assessments on non-participating physicians has been upheld.  See
supra note 29.  The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers has not taken a formal stance on NICA, ac-
cording to interviewees there.  Lawyers are split between those appreciative of new help for injured
people not reached by tort and those opposed to any diminution of traditional tort remedies.  A num-
ber of plaintiffs’ attorneys surveyed by this project were vehement in denouncing NICA.  See Randall
R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence n.227 (submitted for
publication Jan. 1998) (manuscript on file with Randall Bovbjerg).
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times to filing consistent with lawyers’ strategic behavior.168  If there were many
no-fault cases in a drawer we would expect at least some of them to begin to
flow into NICA after some period of delay.  This is not the pattern of filings
observed in Florida.  In contrast, filings predominantly occur in the second year
after birth, then trail off for later years.169  This trend changed only in the un-
usual year of 1995—the high year—when filings came in faster.170  For Florida it
seems likely that borderline cases are actively pursued in court, not kept in a
drawer.  Doing nothing raises at least some legal risk that the statute of limita-
tions will run in tort.171  Long delay also raises the very practical risk that the in-
fant may die,172 reducing the value of the case by cutting off claims for future
losses and lessening allowance for non-pecuniary losses.173  The “drawer” hy-
pothesis is more plausible for Virginia, as discussed in Appendix A.
As a second caveat, program design and administration may change further,
affecting the level of filings.  Virginia lawmakers have twice broadened BIF
coverage.  Coverage was extended to births where either the doctor or the hos-
pital participates, rather than both, and the restrictive requirement of “all
ADLs” was changed to “permanently motorically disabled and (i) developmen-
tally disabled or (ii) … cognitively disabled.”174  In 1997, the state legislature
mandated a study of BIF operations, including expansion.175  There may also be
serious political efforts to broaden the Virginia statute further.176
                                                          
168. See Appendix A.
169. See id.
170. See id. tbl.1A.  It is plausible that the pendancy of the Galen v. Braniff litigation on access to
tort, see supra note 159, changed the 1995 pattern of NICA filings because lawyers wanted to see if the
supreme court would make it possible to bring potentially NICA-eligible cases as tort suits by claiming
lack of effective and timely notice to their clients about NICA.  After the 1996 decision allowing access
to tort, the ability to avoid NICA by claiming lack of notice to an expectant mother will probably re-
duce NICA claims and increase tort claims.  Lawyers can make a notice claim in court, then return to
NICA if unsuccessful, so long as the long NICA statute of limitations has not run.
171. The basic Florida tort statute of limitations is two years.  See FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11(4)(a)
(1996).  A tort-reform statute of repose sets a maximum limit of seven years, but allows any case to be
brought until a child’s eighth birthday.  See FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11(4)(b) (1996).
172. Among the small number of NICA claimants who actually did file, the NICA data show that
only one infant was still alive and still receiving NICA support as of mid 1996 (not presented in tables).
More recent cases may have longer expected lives.  Almost 40 cases were still open as of the end of our
observation period, and the reserves established for future payments are very substantial, as discussed
supra note 42.
173. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suf-
fering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989).
174. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Michie 1994) with 1987 VA. ACTS ch. 540.
175. The statutory mandate for a study of BIF operations was to consider the implications of
broadening eligibility for no-fault in Virginia.  See supra note 9.  Moreover, as a matter of administra-
tive application of statutory eligibility standards, some interview information suggested that the ad-
ministrative response to claims had become more relaxed over time.  Data from BIF’s first five years
do not support this view.  There was only one claim denied in BIF’s first six years of operation, the
very first claim ever filed.  All others were paid through 1993 (only five paid claims in all).  Through
1995, 23 of 29 filings were paid, six denied.  These numbers come from the authors’ tabulation from
primary claims data supplied by the program, based on filings through May 1996.
176. Considerable support for moving more cases from tort to BIF was expressed at a planning
meeting for a legislatively required evaluation of BIF organized by BIF and the Medical Society and
held at the Medical Society in Richmond on April 1, 1997.  One strong supporter was a representative
from a leading liability insurer of physicians.
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For a time, Florida had a broader interpretation imposed by a DOAH deci-
sion and a lower court decision that the statutory requirement of severe im-
pairment both “mentally and physically” should be construed to mean
“mentally or physically,” though the state supreme court eventually returned to
the more obvious restrictive reading.177  Presently, there appears to be little or
no support for expansion of NICA in Florida.
B. Efficiency—Speed of Resolution and Administrative Costs
The measured speed advantage of NICA over comparable tort cases is
great and has become greater recently.  This finding seems quite robust, but
times could become longer if some number of long-pending “cases in a drawer”
do in fact come forward in the future.178  However, the time advantage for no-
fault will likely persist.  The time advantage would even increase if the time
from injury to filing could be reduced below tort levels.  This could occur if the
law and administrative practice became clearer as to just what cases belong in
tort instead of no-fault.  The recent judicial decisions affecting the exclusivity of
NICA, however, seem likely to increase claimants’ difficulty in determining
how to proceed.179
The no-fault advantage with regard to administrative costs is very large,
about ten percent for NICA versus nearly fifty percent for comparable tort
cases.180  Ten percent is a very low rate—closer to the costs of a largely infor-
mal, first-party, non-adversarial compensation system like group health insur-
ance than to a rather adversarial process like Workers’ Compensation, which
has administrative costs of twenty percent or higher.181  The authors’ expecta-
tions were that NICA would resemble Workers’ Compensation, but with higher
costs of investigation and disputation because issues of medical causation ap-
                                                          
177. The case dealt with a child who had to be given an intelligence test with unusual help, includ-
ing a long time period, but so tested showed cognitive development in the normal range.  See Birnie v.
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n., Case No. 93-2955N, at 11 (State of Florida,
Division of Administrative Hearings) (1993) (final order).  NICA accordingly denied the claim, but the
DOAH hearing officer allowed it, reasoning that the very need for a special exam was an indication of
severe mental impairment.  See id. at 16.  NICA appealed, but the Florida District Court of Appeals
interpreted the statutory language as broadly as possible in light of the no-fault intent of the statute to
provide benefits, ruling that the word “and” needed to be read as “and/or.”  See Florida Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Comp. Ass’n. v. Florida Division of Admin. Hearings, 664 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).  The state supreme court overruled this reading, upholding NICA’s more restric-
tive interpretation.  See 686 So. 2d 1349, 1356 (Fla. 1997).  According to the executive director, the
broader interpretation was never implemented for any other case, being held in abeyance while the
DOAH decision was appealed.  The exact nature of the dispute is of less relevance to no-fault gener-
ally than the observation that NICA so strongly opposed this intermediate reasoning of DOAH that
would have expanded its no-fault reach, seemingly because of its perceived need to defend its sol-
vency.
178. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
180. See Table 5 and accompanying text.
181. Loss ratios, benefits paid out divided by total cost to employers, ranged from 70-79% during
1988-1993.  Jack Schmulowitz, Workers’ Compensation: Coverage Benefits and Costs, 1992-93, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., Summer 1995, at 56.  A figure of 20% administrative cost is often heard.  See, e.g.,
Troyen A. Brennan, An Empirical Analysis of Accidents and Accident Law: The Case of Medical Mal-
practice Law, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 823, 856 (1992).
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pear more complex than those of traumatic workplace injury.182  It is possible to
argue that this article could have estimated administrative cost rates differ-
ently,183 but, as for speed, the differences found are so large that no reasonable
adjustment would much alter the basic conclusion.
With regard to future changes, we note that any shift to more formal proc-
esses could also reduce the efficiency observed in Florida.  It may also be that
causation and other elements of eligibility are not as difficult to determine in
these severe cases as is generally supposed.184
C. Informality of Agency Operations
Part of the speed and cost advantages calculated for NICA as against the
tort process must derive from its informal process.  Another consequence of
the program’s small scale combined with its informality and need for expertise
seems less positive for no-fault.  That is, program operations appear to be quite
reliant upon the experience and professional performance of a small number of
people.  Creation of agency expertise is part of the rationale for moving to a
predominantly administrative approach to investigation and dispute resolu-
tion.185  The BIF and NICA Executive Directors had experience in nursing and
in insurance claims management.  Similarly, at DOAH and in the Virginia
Workers’ Compensation system, one administrative hearing officer hears al-
most all no-fault claims, which has fostered the development of expertise.
Also, at NICA more than BIF, great reliance is placed on one medical consult-
ant, whose name appears as reviewer in the large majority of case files.
This reliance on a small cadre of experts may be one reason that NICA can
operate so informally and so inexpensively.  The same reliance also makes such
a small entity seem quite vulnerable to problems of succession at the time of
inevitable turnover in personnel, which has yet to occur.  This issue would pose
far less of a problem for a larger no-fault program than for BIF or NICA.
A broader no-fault program would almost certainly have to operate more
formally.  More rules would be needed simply to educate new employees, as
well as to maintain a consistent approach across cases that is now achieved by
commonality of personnel and individual institutional memory.  More formal
operations could lengthen time to resolution and raise administrative costs.
Offsetting this would be some economies of scale and scope.  On balance, the
                                                          
182. Occupational disease cases under Workers’ Compensation involve similar difficulties of disen-
tangling the extent to which injury derives from workplace factors as against outside disease etiologies,
and it has been argued that such cases feature greater disputation and more common use of attorneys
than do traumatic injury cases.  See Mehlman, supra note 26, at 139 (implying higher administrative
costs).
183. Some of the possible arguments are addressed supra note 121 and accompanying text.
184. An estimate of no-fault eligibility in Florida was determined by companion research that sim-
ply applied common sense to the objective criteria in the statute.  The estimates correlated closely with
actual no-fault determinations.  See Sloan et al., supra note 73.
185. See generally MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATIONS BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COM-
MISSION (1985).  See also Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolv-
ing Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (1988) (discussing the virtues of administra-
tive agency in the context of medical injury resolution).
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observed efficiency advantages seem likely to persist despite rather significant
increases in formality of operations, even if no-fault became somewhat less ef-
ficient absolutely.
Structurally, NICA’s exercise of discretion in the absence of written rules or
clear precedent resembles the role played by a private Workers’ Compensation
insurer that makes discretionary eligibility and payment determinations with-
out public process but subject to administrative reconsideration.  The private
insurer also has a conflict with a covered employee that is similar to that of
NICA facing a claimant, in that insurer payments come from a fixed pool of
premium income.  Indeed, they directly reduce insurer profit or surplus.  For
such an insurer, there appear to be two protections not yet present in these
early medical no-fault models.  First, insurers face a market test, whereas
NICA, by statute, has exclusive authority to receive and attempt to resolve
claims.  Thus, a private insurer that boosts short-term profit through unreason-
able claims denial faces long-term damage to reputation and market share.186
Second, Workers’ Compensation, as a much older and larger program, has a far
more developed set of precedents and written rules about eligibility and bene-
fits than does either BIF or NICA at their current stage of development.187
VI
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR BROADER NO-FAULT
The experience of these idiosyncratic no-fault programs in Virginia and
Florida is relevant to the issues of broader no-fault performance, although the
precise findings of this data-based study of two small programs seem unlikely to
be precisely replicated.  We draw six general lessons.
First, a form of no-fault is clearly feasible for at least some medical issues.
Administration of BIF and NICA “works” successfully.  That is, premiums are
collected, and claims are received, investigated, and paid with not unreasonable
results in an area that is very contentious in tort.  In this, our interviews and
other observations accord with prior study.188
Second, even these limited programs achieve major gains in efficiency com-
pared with the tort process for similar cases.  That is, no-fault delivers benefits
quite similar in value to tort,189 but much faster and with far lower administra-
tive costs.  The efficiency gains are so large that even somewhat different expe-
rience under broader no-fault would almost surely prove more efficient than
                                                          
186. This argument assumes that employers represent employee interests either directly or because
they face active unions or other employee interests.
187. See, e.g., JONATHAN L. ALPERT ET AL., FLORIDA PRACTICE HANDBOOK: WORKERS’
COMPENSATION WITH FORMS (1995).
188. See Horwitz & Brennan, supra note 9.  A companion study from this project also found that
families with no-fault experience and those with tort experience report similar levels of satisfaction
with the two processes, see Whetten-Goldstein et al., supra note 107, although quite clearly these no-
fault programs afford a less public forum than tort courtrooms for airing of grievances against medical
providers.
189. See supra text accompanying note 117 and Table 5.
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tort.  Thus, any quid pro quo constitutional analysis190 will very likely validate
similar no-fault approaches.
Third, reaching the intended eligible population requires more than just
legislating benefits and a claims process.  Attention must be paid to administra-
tive mechanisms, incentives, and financing.  Virginia and Florida meant to cre-
ate very limited “carve outs” from tort, but the programs in operation have
proved more limited still.  One problem is that the statutes decreed a new com-
pensation and dispute resolution system but no new method of case finding and
“intake.”  Accordingly, the old mechanism applies—families are left to recog-
nize injuries and to seek counsel from plaintiffs’ lawyers, and, in practice, un-
derclaiming in no-fault seems nearly as severe as under tort.  Another problem
is that no-fault funding is essentially fixed and that program administrators
have to give higher priority to maintaining solvency than to publicizing the
availability of no-fault benefits or seeking out eligible claimants.  In advance,
we expected that medical providers, who benefit from the tort protection of no-
fault, would refer eligible patients.  In hindsight, this expectation seems naive,
as providers cannot be certain that families encouraged to seek legal redress
will not go to tort in place of no-fault.
Fourth, the survival of tort remedies is an Achilles heel for no-fault.  Con-
tinued tort claiming is making no-fault smaller than intended, especially in
Florida, which suggests two problems for any future program to remedy.  For
one thing, narrow no-fault eligibility and correspondingly only partial tort im-
munity leaves substantial disputation over boundaries.  Claimants try to move
their cases one way or the other depending upon the perceived merits and po-
tential recoveries to themselves (and their attorneys) under the two competing
systems.191  This is not efficient.  For another, judicial interpretation in Florida
allows litigation even for cases potentially eligible for no-fault benefits.  The
possibility for attorneys to do an “end run” around no-fault probably helps ex-
plain the lack of direct frontal assault on the statute’s constitutionality.  Clearer
draftsmanship might help future no-fault programs as a matter of law.  Building
a good administrative reputation for prompt, accurate, and efficient payment of
benefits surely could not hurt as a matter of applied jurisprudence.192  Routinely
generating performance information like that in this article would surely help
build both political and legal support where performance is indeed good—of
course, non-performing programs do not deserve public support.
Fifth, there are reasons to think that an expanded no-fault program would
be more satisfactory.  Reaching more of the eligible cases would have benefi-
cial results for both compensation and deterrence.  The improvement of com-
pensation from increased coverage is obvious.  Underclaiming leaves many
                                                          
190. See Ward, supra note 8, at 438.
191. See Sloan et al., supra note 73.
192. It would also be easier to maintain clear boundaries between tort and no-fault systems if no-
fault “carve outs” were broader, especially if based upon more objective criteria or ex ante circum-
stances rather than on more subjective circumstances relating to ex post injuries.  How one might ac-
complish that goes well beyond the scope of this article.
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losses to be borne by injured parties themselves.  Bringing more such cases un-
der no-fault would raise benefit costs, but presumably with some offsetting
savings in tort administration and possibly elsewhere as well.  Administratively,
having more cases could also improve the delivery of benefits, if it enabled ad-
ministrators to do more case management or contracting with service providers
than is possible for a small program.193  Potential improvements for deterrence
are less obvious.  Larger size could facilitate experience rating of assessments.
It would also facilitate analyses of patterns of bad outcomes, so as to improve
understanding of how and why injuries occur.  Over time, administrators could
then craft responses, through education, incentives, or regulation.  These no-
fault programs are just too small to do such broad risk management.
Sixth, larger no-fault programs could not operate just as these do now.  For
a start, a more comprehensive no-fault program would almost certainly draw
more attacks from the trial bar and more judicial scrutiny, if only because it
would be a larger threat to the status quo.  For an ongoing program, efficiency
could be affected in both directions.  Larger size could result in some econo-
mies of scale, but there might be new costs of inevitable bureaucratization.  A
more formal style of operations would be necessary, including written rules.
Creating clear rules can reduce search costs for claimants and their attorneys,
as well as the costs of disputes for everyone, but it may increase costs to the
rule makers who must develop and promulgate them.  The sense of justice
could thus be served by better accountability of program administration, par-
alleling potentially improved accountability of medical actors for medically
caused injuries.  Consistency of results might also be more easily maintained
and demonstrated to outside observers.  BIF and NICA now operate with great
discretion, and controlling discretion at a reasonable cost is one of the raisons
d’etre of administrative law and procedure.194
In sum, these pioneering no-fault programs demonstrate remarkable ad-
ministrative achievements, although hardly without shortcomings, from which
others can learn.  Happily, administration on its own has also created good in-
formation with which to assess program performance.  Perhaps one day, similar
information will also be routinely created for the tort system.
                                                          
193. For a discussion of possible management of ongoing severe injury, see James F. Blumstein et
al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE
J. REG. 171, 190 (1991).
194. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 97 (1994).
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APPENDIX A
PATTERNS IN FILING OF NO-FAULT CASES: BY YEAR OF INCIDENT AND
YEAR OF CLAIM
It is hard to estimate mature no-fault caseload from the pattern of claims by
filing year, as presented in Table 1 in the principal text.  The more detailed ta-
bles A and B presented in this Appendix facilitate making the long-run
caseload estimates already presented in the text—about thirty to forty cases per
year in Florida and three to six per year in Virginia.  They also make it possible
to address the “cases in a drawer” hypothesis by observing how quickly birth-
injury cases are filed in each state and whether this pattern changes over time.
There is suggestive evidence that Virginia cases were held out of no-fault until
filing year 1995 and that Florida filing patterns permanently shifted lower that
year, plausibly because of judicial test cases affecting NICA jurisdiction.
Appendix Tables A and B array no-fault claims in the two states both by
year of filing and by year of injury, i.e., birth.a  This presentation is very similar
to the “claims development triangles” routinely used by malpractice actuaries
in projecting likely future claims rates from past experience.b  Table A presents
the Florida experience, and B shows that of Virginia.
Consider Florida first.
TABLE A
PATTERNS IN FLOW OF NO-FAULT CASES FROM INJURY TO FILING:
YEAR CLAIMS MADE BY YEAR OF BIRTH IN FLORIDA
Year Of Claim
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Birth Year
Claims Tot.
1989 0 5 12 4 4 3 2 1 31
1990 -- 1 6 11 9 3 7 0 37
Year 1991 -- -- 0 6 11 7 5 3 32
Of 1992 -- -- -- 5 6 20 8 1 40
Birth 1993 -- -- -- -- 3 6 23 1 33
1994 -- -- -- -- -- 3 13 5 21
1995 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2 0 2
1996 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0
Filing Year
Claims Tot.
0 6 18 26 33 42 60 11 196
NOTE:  Shading indicates mode of claims distribution (most common filing year per birth year).
                                                          
a In each case, the year is calendar year, that is, from January 1 through December 31.
b See Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How No-Fault and
Tort Differ, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (Spring 1997).
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The bottom row of total claims by filing year shows a steady rise in claims
until the unusual upsurge in 1995, then an abrupt decline for our partial year of
1996.  It is equivalent to the Florida column of Table 1.  To estimate the long-
run, “steady state” flow of cases, we examine the vertical totals at the far right,
which show how many cases NICA has received arising from each birth year
since implementation.  This “yield” of filings by birth year has been quite con-
sistent—thirty-one, thirty-seven, thirty-two, etc.c  The observed average is 32.3
filings per birth year,d but the long-run average might be expected to be higher
because the recent birth years have had a much shorter period of “run off”
during which claims can come in.  Consider the birth year 1989.  Three claims
(ten percent of the total ever filed) came in during 1995-96, the sixth and sev-
enth years after birth.  So, for all subsequent years, we expect additional claims
ultimately to be filed, up to the point where further claims “development” is
cut off by the statute of limitations.  The statute was seven years in 1989-92, re-
duced to five in 1993.
Based on these considerations alone, a good estimate for “ultimate” total
claims per birth year is probably around forty, the high level observed through
1994.  However, the totals for 1995 and 1996 dropped markedly.  To consider
the meaning of this, we examine birth-year claims development over time.
Claims development is shown across each of the horizontal rows.  The top
row of Appendix Table A, for example, displays all the births from 1989 that
ever resulted in NICA filings (that is, all filed before June 1996).  The birth
year 1989 was the only possible one that could lead to 1989 filings; and, as al-
ready noted, no claims were filed that year, hence the zero at the upper left and
the dashes, for “not applicable,” in the rest of the column below.  The filing
year total for 1989, at the lower left, is therefore also zero.
Continuing to follow claims arising from 1989 births, five more claims were
filed in the second possible year, 1990 (top of second column from left in Table
A).  The next filing year, 1991, saw twelve filings from 1989 births, then claims
trailed off—to four in each of 1992 and 1993, three in 1994, two in 1995, and
one in partial-year 1996.  The statistical “mode”—or highest single number in
the distribution, twelve in filing year 1992—is shaded.  These shaded modes
highlight the observation that cases most commonly are filed in the third year
after birth.  The shadings slant regularly down and right across the triangle.e
That the third year is the most common is consistent with the finding in Table 4
                                                          
c The discrepancy between steadily rising filing-year totals and relatively constant birth-year totals is
easy to explain: It is a normal, arithmetic side-effect of observing early program development.  During
claims year 1989, filings could come from only a single birth year, that is, 1989.  In 1990, claims could
come from two birth years, in 1991 from three, and so on.
d This average number of filings per birth year omits birth years 1995 and 1996 as too recent for reli-
able observation, as they do not include the normally modal third year after birth.  Even for 1995, the
earlier omitted year, only twelve months on average was available for filing before the end of our data
collection, that is, January 1995 through May 1996 maximum observation period, December 1995
through May 1996 minimum.
e The rectangular array is called a triangle because only the triangle in its upper right contains data.
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that the median time to filing is 600-700 days after birth, longer in the more re-
cent period.f
Something did change for birth years 1994 and 1995, however.  Their modes
were only two years and one year, respectively.  This effect occurred partly be-
cause the observation period did not include the full third year after birth for
either birth year.  We also suspect that pending litigation in 1995-96 reduced
the previously normal rate of flow of NICA cases.
In particular, we surmise that the underlying propensity to bring NICA
claims was permanently reduced by the litigation leading to the Florida Su-
preme Court’s 1996 McKaughan ruling that claimants could go directly to court
for a judicial ruling on their NICA eligibility.g  The Galen litigation allowing
tort lawsuits alleging inadequate notice of NICA may also have cut back on
NICA filings as early as 1995, the year of a lower court ruling.h  Beyond the ob-
servation period of this study, we learned that 1996 and 1997 total filing year
cases were below pre-existing levels, which also supports an expectation of re-
duced claiming.i
The developmental triangle for Virginia has the same format in Appendix
Table B.j  Viewed by birth year, total filings are relatively steady, at three to six
per year, an average of four per year during 1988-1994 (far right column).
From this, one would expect an ultimately somewhat higher per-year total, al-
lowing for the truncated observation of claims development for recent birth
years.
                                                          
f The average time from birth to filing in the third year (the mode) is only two years, not three.  That is,
for births in year 1990, say, the typical case represents a birth on June 30, 1990, and a filing on June 30,
1992, each date being half way through the year.  Elapsed time is thus two years.
g See principal text at note 158 and accompanying text.
h The lower court case was Braniff v. Galen of Florida, Inc., 669 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995),
aff’d sub nom. 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997).  See also principal text at note 159.
i See principal text at note 102 and accompanying text (31 claims filed in 1996, 29 in 1997).
j However, BIF took effect a year before NICA, so that there are nine rows in Table B, representing
years 1988-96, not eight as in Table A for Florida.
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 TABLE B
PATTERNS IN FLOW OF NO-FAULT CASES FROM INJURY TO FILING:
YEAR CLAIMS MADE BY YEAR OF BIRTH IN VIRGINIA
Year Of Claim
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Birth Year
Claims Tot.
1988 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
1989 -- 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 6
1990 -- -- 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 4
Year 1991 -- -- -- 0 0 1 0 3 0 4
Of 1992 -- -- -- -- 1 0 0 3 1 5
Birth 1993 -- -- -- -- -- 0 4 1 0 5
1994 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 1 0 1
1995 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2 0 2
1996 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0
Filing Year
Claims Tot.
0 0 1 1 3 1 7 16 1 30
NOTE:  Shading indicates mode of claims distribution (single most common filing year for
each birth year).
SOURCES: NICA administrative data, as of June 10, 1996; BIF data, as of June 4, 1996
However, the pattern of development of cases by claims year is highly un-
usual, as already noted.k  Only five cases were filed all together in the first six
filing years of the program’s existence.  Over half of them came in during a sin-
gle filing year, 1995.  The triangle of Table B shows how this occurred—the
modal year of filing for almost every birth year was claims year 1995.l  We know
of no statistical test of significance for this finding, but it seems inconceivably
unlikely to have occurred by chance.  It seems almost certain to have occurred
because of some interaction between program administrators, claimants and
their lawyers, and the courts, which provide an alternative route to claim.
Administrators could not explain this “bulge” in filings, except to say that
somewhat more than the usual outreach had occurred, including meetings with
patient advocates.  The bulge is consistent with the hypothesis that many early-
year Virginia cases were kept “in a drawer” until 1995.  Filings for all of 1996
fell drastically from the 1995 level, then for 1997 rose again to three-quarters of
the 1995 total.m  The up-and-down Virginia experience provides scant basis for
                                                          
k See principal text at note 100 and accompanying text.
l Birth year 1989 was bi-modal, but 1995 was one of the two modes.  Birth year 1988 had only three
claims in all, one in each of three different, widely spaced years, so its distribution cannot be said to
have a mode.
m See principal text at note 102 (3 claims filed in 1996, 12 in 1997).
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predicting any one year’s filings, but a range of three to six is not unreasonable.
There is no basis for predicting a long-run decline in filings, unlike in Florida.
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APPENDIX B
THE SIX NICA CASES EXCEEDING $100,000 IN DEDICATED LEGAL EXPENSESa
CASE A. Filing year: 1990.  Legal/total cost: $253,000/$1,000,000.  Parental
award: $100,000.  Disputed issue(s): NICA status and powers (contract author-
ity, rule making); benefits (nature of parental award, sharing between divorced
parents; specialized transportation; parents’ counseling; cost of family hospi-
talization insurance; housing; swimming pool for aquatic therapy; rehabilitative
services; care manager; respite care; collateral source offset); allowable service
providers (e.g., mother, grandmother, family friend); attorneys’ fees and costs
(first as to amount, then as to interest).  Comments: There were three separate
proceedings: first at Workers’ Compensation on benefits; second on attorneys’
fees, then judicial review; third at DOAH on interest.  Causation was undis-
puted.  The infant’s earlier born twin had only temporary problems from being
born at the eighth month, while the claimant infant had a very difficult delivery
ending with pitocin to induce labor, then manipulation and suction to deliver
vaginally.  Injury was severe, massive intra-cranial hemorrhage resulting in
permanent blindness, incapability of purposeful movement, profound retarda-
tion.  Many types of benefits were disputed, as well as the process by which the
claimant could order services, and get NICA to pay.  The powers of NICA were
argued.  Overall, this was an elaborate, litigation-like process, with lengthy
formal hearing and opinions at Workers’ Compensation, also hearing and
opinion at DOAH.
CASE B. Filing year: 1990.  Legal/total cost: $202,000/$522,000.  Parental
award: $100,000.  Disputed issue(s): benefits (experimental services, out-of-
country care, European travel by infant and four accompanying adults).  Com-
ments: Causation was undisputed.  Injury was severe, leaving the infant spastic,
with cortical blindness, microcephaly and virtually no psychomotor develop-
ment.  The child operates at precognitive level, has problems swallowing, for
which the mother sought unusual Hungarian treatment.  NICA disputed medi-
cal necessity, and had referred infant to specialty institute in Baltimore.  Had
DOAH hearing (travel denied) and judicial review (travel approved).
CASE C. Filing year: 1991.  Legal/total cost: $125,000/$604,000.  Parental
award: $100,000.  Disputed issue(s): causation.  Comments: According to NICA,
injury was severe but eligibility was unclear, because injury might have been
caused by an underlying genetic syndrome.  NICA never got a definitive medi-
cal opinion on causation and in absence of good evidence against, allowed eli-
gibility.  There was no hearing.  High expense came from high investigative
costs.
CASE D. Filing year: 1991.  Legal/total cost: $128,000/$448,000. Parental
award: $100,000.  Disputed issue(s): Causation/eligibility, attorneys’ fees and
costs (number of lawyers, extent of work done).  Comments: Severity of injury
                                                          
a Sources: Duplicated Workers’ Compensation or DOAH order(s) for five cases, ancillary documents,
including brief in sixth case; NICA administrative data; and administrative interviews.
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was clear, but eligibility was initially disputed by NICA based on the consultant
obstetrician’s opinion being given more weight than the contrary neurologist’s
opinion, neither of which was given to opposing counsel.  The NICA consultant
and NICA opinion subsequently reversed when attorneys for the claimant
found independent evidence of causation, so that eligibility was undisputed by
the time of hearing.  Two sets of attorneys submitted bills, one for eligibility
claim, the other for assistance with claimant’s immediate needs, including
NICA-eligible services.  Hearing dealt mainly with attorneys’ fees, standards
for determination, and application to this case.
CASE E. Filing year: 1991.  Legal/total cost: $108,000/$115,000.  Parental
award: ineligible case.  Disputed issue(s): causation.  Comments: There was a
three-day hearing at Workers’ Compensation in 1993, but no hearing order was
entered.  Proceedings began anew at DOAH.  The denial of eligibility was on
judicial review at the close of our observation period.  NICA reports that non-
eligibility was upheld.
CASE F. Filing year: 1994.  Legal/total cost: $148,000/$185,000.  Parental
award: $100,000.  Disputed issue(s): benefits (special van, payment to mother
for custodian attendant care); access to child by NICA to assess needs.
